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COMMENT 
U.S. ENERGY SANCTIONS AND THE RACE TO 
PREVENT IRAN FROM ACQUIRING WEAPONS 
OF MASS DESTRUCTION 
Quinton Cannon Farrar*
 
 
The United States has used economic sanctions targeting the energy 
sector that is so vital to Iran’s economy with varying degrees of intensity 
since the Iran Hostage Crisis of 1979.  By and large, the sanctions did not 
have their intended effect.  By 2010, Iran was the foremost state-sponsor of 
terrorism and was on the brink of acquiring the capability to develop 
nuclear weapons—a phenomenon that could have cataclysmic 
repercussions for American interests in the Middle East and beyond. 
In July 2010, Congress passed and President Obama signed the 
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, 
in an effort to use the most drastic sanctions measures yet to finally change 
the course of Iran’s behavior.  This Comment begins by tracing the history 
of United States petroleum-related sanctions against Iran through various 
inflection points since 1979.  This Comment then discusses the political 
context, content, and preliminary implementation of the latest round of 
sanctions against Iran.  Thereafter, this Comment critically analyzes the 
legal bases, political challenges, and inherent policy difficulties 
surrounding the new sanctions law.  Finally, this Comment proposes a 
number of policy recommendations for the President and Congress in light 
of the changing policy landscape. 
In sum, this Comment concludes that a far-reaching, robustly applied, 
multilateral sanctions policy remains the last, best hope of peacefully 
preventing Iran from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 2348 
I.  A HISTORY OF UNITED STATES SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN’S 
ENERGY SECTOR (1979–2009) ..................................................... 2353 
 
*  J.D. Candidate, 2012, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., magna cum laude, 2007, 
Boston College. Special thanks to Professor Andrew Kent for his thoughtful criticism and 
high expectations.   
2348 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
A.  Primary Sanctions by Executive Order .................................. 2353 
1.  The Hostage Crisis (1979–1981) ..................................... 2353 
2.  The Lebanese Civil War .................................................. 2354 
3.   The Iran-Iraq War ........................................................... 2355 
4.  Clinton Administration Executive Orders........................ 2356 
B.  Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 .................................... 2357 
1.  The Passage of Extraordinary Measures .......................... 2357 
2.  Challenges from the Inception ......................................... 2359 
C.  The Bush Administration:  Continuation of a Failed Policy .. 2362 
II.  THE COMPREHENSIVE IRAN SANCTIONS ACCOUNTABILITY AND 
DIVESTMENT ACT OF 2010 ........................................................... 2364 
A.  Speaking Softly:  President Obama’s Failed Policy of 
Outreach ............................................................................... 2364 
B.  Carrying a Big Stick?:  The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 ......................... 2367 
C.  An International Consensus Tentatively Emerges .................. 2370 
D.  Preliminary Implementation................................................... 2372 
III.  ISSUES IN EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION:  A CRITICAL ANALYSIS .. 2374 
A.  Legal Barriers to Effective Implementation:  Limits to 
Prescriptive Jurisdiction ....................................................... 2375 
1.  Limits from Customary International Law ...................... 2375 
2.  Constitutional Limits ....................................................... 2377 
B.  Political Barriers to Effective Implementation ....................... 2378 
1.  The Inter-Branch Conflict:  A Classic Problem of 
Foreign Relations Law .................................................... 2378 
2.  Past Precedent:  The ILSA & Presidential Inaction ......... 2380 
3.  Congressional Initiative:  Signs of a Change? ................. 2381 
C.  Endemic Barriers to Effective Implementation....................... 2383 
1.  Sanctions Lack Credibility ............................................... 2384 
2.  Sanctions Lack Strength .................................................. 2385 
IV.  RECOMMENDATIONS ........................................................................ 2387 
A.  The President .......................................................................... 2387 
1.  Iran ................................................................................... 2387 
2.  America’s Allies and Iran’s Trading Partners .................. 2388 
B.  Congress ................................................................................. 2390 
1.  Oversight and Investigation ............................................. 2390 
2.  Legislation ....................................................................... 2392 
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................... 2393 
 
INTRODUCTION 
On July 1, 2010, President Barack Obama signed into law the 
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 
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2010 (Comprehensive Act).1  “In short,” President Obama said at the bill 
signing ceremony, “with these sanctions, along with others, we are striking 
at the heart of the Iranian Government’s ability to fund and develop its 
nuclear program.  We’re showing the Iranian Government that its actions 
have consequences.”2  Substantively, the Comprehensive Act greatly 
expanded the types of actors (including non-U.S. corporations) that may be 
sanctioned for their relationship with Iran; increased the number of 
sanctions which the President must impose on actors in violation of the law; 
and, at least in theory, made it more difficult for the President to avoid 
issuing sanctions.3  The President acknowledged that the bill he was signing 
amounted to “the toughest sanctions against Iran ever passed by the United 
States Congress.”4
The drafters of the Comprehensive Act paid particular attention to 
focusing sanctions on Iran’s energy sector.
   
5  Today, Iran holds the third 
largest proven petroleum reserves in the world behind Saudi Arabia and 
Canada,6 and the second largest natural gas reserves behind only Russia.7  
Revenues from the state-dominated energy sector account for nearly 80% of 
Iran’s export earnings and roughly 40% of all government revenue.8  Yet, 
in spite of its enormous reserves, Iran’s energy infrastructure is decaying, 
and without foreign investment and expertise, Iran faces a serious 
production decline.9  Moreover, due to its lack of refining capacity, Iran has 
to import close to half of all the gasoline it needs to meet domestic 
consumption requirements.10
By targeting firms that invest in Iran’s domestic energy infrastructure or 
export refined petroleum products to Iran, the Comprehensive Act presents 
the Obama Administration and its allies around the world with a 
tremendous opportunity to put pressure on the Iranian regime to cease both 
its development of nuclear weapons and its funding of international 
terrorism.  Since his election in 2005, Iranian President Mahmoud 
Ahmadinejad has tried to impose a markedly populist fiscal policy 
 
 
 1. Pub. L. No. 111-195, 124 Stat. 1312 (2010) (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. 
§§ 8501–8551).  The Senate passed the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and 
Divestment Act of 2010 (Comprehensive Act) by a vote of 99-0; the House passed the bill 
by a vote of 408-8. KENNETH KATZMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20871, IRAN SANCTIONS 
13 (2011). 
 2. Remarks on Signing the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and 
Divestment Act of 2010, 2010 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 568 (July 1, 2010). 
 3. § 102, 124 Stat. at 1317–28; see also Jay Solomon et al., U.S. Adds Its Own 
Sanctions on Iran, WALL ST. J., July 2, 2010, at A7. 
 4. Remarks on Signing the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and 
Divestment Act of 2010, supra note 2, at 2. 
 5. § 102, 124 Stat. at 1317–28; see also KATZMAN, supra note 1, at 12–13. 
 6. SHAYERAH ILIAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34525, IRAN’S ECONOMIC CONDITIONS:  
U.S. POLICY ISSUES 12 (2010). 
 7. Id. at 13. 
 8. Id. at 21. 
 9. Spencer Swartz & Benoit Faucon, Iran’s Falling Oil Output Means Less Revenue, 
Clout, WALL ST. J., June 26, 2010, at A7. 
 10. ILIAS, supra note 6, at 21. 
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providing extensive public subsidies on gasoline, food, and housing.11  
Although inflation was already quite high in Iran at the time of the passage 
of the Comprehensive Act in July 2010,12 once Ahmadinejad phased out the 
subsidies in December 2010, due to fiscal pressure from mismanagement of 
the economy and increasing international isolation, price increases in such 
consumer staples as food, fuel, and transportation immediately began to 
cause pain to Iranians.13  Whereas Ahmadinejad was able to repress 
domestic unrest following his reportedly fraudulent reelection in 2009,14 the 
political fallout resulting from the across-the-board price shocks in 2011 
could be widespread.15
Yet, to what avail?  In the past, American sanctions against Iran have 
been largely unsuccessful in isolating the Iranian regime and forcing it to 
end its belligerent behavior.
  Thus, by attempting to cut off Iran from the global 
petroleum markets, American policy makers have the potential to make the 
cost of gasoline so dear, and the revenues from foreign investment so 
scarce, that the Iranian regime, if it does not suspend its nuclear program, 
must face the unenviable dilemma of further destroying the Iranian fiscal 
system or facing the wrath of the Iranian population. 
16
As Part I of this Comment details, following the 1979 Iranian Revolution, 
U.S. relations with Iran have been exceptionally adversarial.  From the time 
the Khomeinist regime took power, Iran has been assessed as an “unusual 
and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy and 
economy of the United States.”
 
17  At no point, however, has the United 
States’s rivalry with Iran hit as critical of an impasse as it has today.  Iran 
poses a potentially existential threat to Israel,18
 
 11. Id. at 6.  Gasoline subsidies alone represented roughly 12% of Iran’s gross domestic 
product. Id.  The subsidies allowed gasoline to be sold at the equivalent of thirty-eight cents 
per gallon. William Yong, Gas Prices Soar in Iran as Subsidy is Reduced, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
20, 2010, at A6. 
 is actively seeking to 
 12. In 2009, Iran’s consumer prices rose on a year-over-year average of greater than 
13%. ILIAS, supra note 6, at 5. 
 13. Ramin Mostaghim & Borzou Daragahi, Prices and Anger Rise in Iran After 
Subsidies Lifted, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2010, at A3. 
 14. See infra notes 158–62 and accompanying text. 
 15. See Mostaghim & Daragahi, supra note 13 (reporting on work stoppages across Iran 
and emboldened political opposition to Ahmadinejad). 
 16. See infra Part I. 
 17. Exec. Order No. 12,170, 44 Fed. Reg. 65,729 (Nov. 14, 1979) (executive order from 
President Carter freezing Iranian assets during hostage crisis); see also infra note 38 and 
accompanying text. 
 18. In a recent visit to the United States, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu 
stated in a speech: 
The greatest danger facing Israel and the world is the prospect of a nuclear-armed 
Iran.  Iran threatens to annihilate Israel.  It denies the Holocaust.  It sponsors terror.  
It confronts America in Afghanistan and Iraq.  It dominates Lebanon and Gaza. . . . 
Now, this is what Iran is doing without nuclear weapons.  Imagine what it would 
do with them.  Imagine the devastation that its terror proxies, Hezbollah and 
Hamas and others, would wreak under an Iranian nuclear umbrella. 
Benjamin Netanyahu, Prime Minister, Israel, Speech at the General Assembly of the Jewish 
Federations of North America in New Orleans (Nov. 8, 2010), available at 
http://www.pmo.gov.il/PMOEng/Communication/PMSpeaks/speechga081110.htm.  Prime 
Minister Netanyahu went on to argue that while the economic sanctions imposed upon Iran 
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undermine the delicate and hard-won peace in Iraq,19 and continues to be 
the largest state sponsor of terrorism in the world.20  In sum, as a recent 
National Security Strategy memorandum stated, the United States “may 
face no greater challenge from a single country than from Iran.”21
The assessment of Iran’s threat to the national interests of the United 
States stems in large part from Iran’s weapons of mass destruction 
programs.
 
22  According to recent International Atomic Energy Agency 
estimates, Iran has developed enough uranium for two nuclear weapons.23  
Although the uranium has only been enriched to a level that would be 
suitable for civilian energy purposes, U.S. intelligence officials estimate 
that Iran is currently only three to five years away from developing nuclear 
weapons if it continues to enrich uranium for belligerent purposes.24
Additionally, Iran’s support for international terrorist groups continues to 
undermine the Israeli peace process, destabilize the extremely tentative 
political equilibrium inside of U.S. allies Iraq and Lebanon, and has been 
directly responsible for the death of American servicemen in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.
 
25
 
by the United States and its allies were exacting a toll on the Iranian government, they will 
not change the Iranian regime’s drive to attain a nuclear weapon unless they are backed by 
“a credible threat of military action.” Id. 
  Moreover, in the wake of the September 11 terrorist attacks 
In a provocative article in the September 2010 issue of The Atlantic Monthly entitled “The 
Point of No Return,” author Jeffrey Goldberg raised increased speculation that the Israeli 
military will preemptively strike at Iran’s nuclear infrastructure to prevent or delay the 
development of nuclear weapons by a regime that has repeatedly threatened to wipe the State 
of Israel off the map. Jeffrey Goldberg, The Point of No Return, ATL. MONTHLY, Sept. 2010, 
at 56.  In response to Netanyahu’s contention that only the credible threat of military action 
can cause Iran to end its nuclear ambitions, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated that 
while “when it comes to Iran . . . all options are on the table,” the Obama Administration 
“continue[s] to believe that the political, economic approach that we are taking is in fact 
having an impact in Iran.” Phil Stewart & Arshad Mohammed, U.S. Says Sanctions Against 
Iran “Having Impact,” REUTERS (Nov. 8, 2010, 3:31 AM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6A70JA20101108.  Although it is not clear what 
the Obama Administration’s next course of action will be if the economic sanctions do not 
work and Iran continues to develop nuclear weapons, the Administration has repeatedly 
warned Israel that a military strike could have far-reaching consequences that are detrimental 
to both countries’ interests in the region. See Goldberg, supra, at 59–61. 
 19. KENNETH KATZMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32048, IRAN:  U.S. CONCERNS AND 
POLICY RESPONSES 40 (2010) (detailing Iranian efforts to engage in a proxy war by 
providing arms, training, guidance, and financing to pro-Iranian militia groups involved in 
sectarian violence that has killed American soldiers). 
 20. Id. at 37. 
 21. Id. at 19 n.9. 
 22. International scrutiny of Iran’s nuclear program intensified in 2003 when it was 
revealed that A.Q. Khan, the nuclear scientist behind Pakistan’s development of nuclear 
weapons, sold Iran nuclear technologies and designs. Id. at 23. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id.  Iranian leaders claim that Iran is developing nuclear technologies for peaceful 
energy purposes, which they claim is their right as a party to the international Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty. Id. at 24.  These claims have been met with widespread skepticism in 
the United States in part because of the perception that Iran’s regime views a nuclear weapon 
as the strategic instrument it can use to dominate the Persian Gulf region. Id.  Furthermore, 
Iran is developing uranium enrichment sites that appear unsuitable for purely civilian uses. 
Id. at 23. 
 25. Id. at 36–48. 
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and the continuing Global War on Terror, Iran’s cooperation with Al Qaeda 
and support for the Taliban and other militants in Afghanistan have caused 
the rift between the United States and Iran to grow deeper.26
As the Obama Administration prepares to implement the Comprehensive 
Act, there are legitimate questions over whether this new sanctions regime 
will actually be given substance and force.
 
27  After all, following the 
passage of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (ILSA),28 the Clinton 
and Bush Administrations did not sanction a single foreign company 
investing in Iran’s energy sector, because of a desire to avoid international 
trade conflicts.29  Although the language of the Comprehensive Act is 
apparently tougher and gives the President less discretionary space to avoid 
carrying out sanctions,30 it is not clear whether the Obama Administration 
will have the temerity to carry out the sanctions to an extent that will make 
them effective.31
In Part I, this Comment recounts the history of U.S. sanctions toward 
Iran, including the failures of the 1996 Iran and Libya Sanctions Act.  Part 
II examines the present state of sanctions against Iran including President 
Obama’s diplomatic efforts and the mandates imposed by Congress’s 
passage of the Comprehensive Act.  In Part III, this Comment critically 
analyzes the potential legal and policy implications of the Comprehensive 
Act.  Part III discusses:  (1) the legal barriers posed to implementing the 
sanctions; (2) whether the amended language instituted by the 
Comprehensive Act will make it any more likely that extraterritorial 
sanctions will be effectively implemented; and (3) whether, given the 
checkered history of U.S. economic sanctions, the Act will have the desired 
effect or potentially backfire.  In Part IV, this Comment asserts that the full 
implementation of the Comprehensive Act represents the last best chance to 
prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons without resorting to armed 
conflict.  This Comment contends that the Obama Administration should 
sanction companies from countries—especially China—that are not 
cooperating in implementing sanctions that do energy-related business with 
Iran. 
 
 
 26. Id. at 44–47. 
 27. See, e.g., Press Release, Senator Jon Kyl, Kyl Reaction to Sanctions on NAFTIRAN 
(Sept. 30, 2010), available at http://kyl.senate.gov/record.cfm?id=328110 (“For more than 
12 years, the Iran Sanctions Act has not been enforced. . . . The Administration, by 
continuing to ignore blatant violations of our sanctions laws by Chinese companies, has 
undermined our sanctions regime on Iran.”). 
 28. Pub. L. No. 104-172, 110 Stat. 1541. 
 29. See KATZMAN, supra note 1, at 6. 
 30. For instance, under the previous legislation, the President could issue a waiver if it 
was “important” to the United States’s national interest. § 9(c), 110 Stat. at 1547.  The 
Comprehensive Act amends that provision, requiring that the President only issue a waiver if 
it is “necessary” to the national interest. The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, 
and Divestment Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-195, § 102(c)(2)(B), 124 Stat. 1312, 1322 
(codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 8513(f)(1)). 
 31. See, e.g., Josh Rogin, Will the Obama Administration Sanction Chinese Companies 
Doing Business in Iran?, FOREIGN POLICY:  THE CABLE (Oct. 5, 2010, 1:31 PM), 
http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/10/05/will_the_obama_administration_sanction
_chinese_companies_doing_business_in_iran.  
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I.  A HISTORY OF UNITED STATES SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN’S ENERGY 
SECTOR (1979–2009) 
The United States has used economic sanctions targeted against Iran’s 
energy sector as a foreign policy tool since the time of the Iranian 
Revolution and the subsequent Hostage Crisis of 1979.  This part traces the 
history of those sanctions over the thirty years from the Hostage Crisis until 
the inauguration of President Barack Obama in 2009.  As this part 
demonstrates, such sanctions were largely unsuccessful in causing Iran to 
alter its belligerent behavior. 
A.  Primary Sanctions by Executive Order 
1.  The Hostage Crisis (1979–1981) 
Mass demonstrations in opposition to the government of the Shah of Iran, 
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, caused the collapse of the Shah’s regime in 
January 1979.32  After stoking the revolution in exile,33 the Iranian cleric 
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini returned to Iran to declare an Islamic 
Republic of Iran.34  From the beginning, Khomeini fiercely opposed the 
policies of the United States, stating that “[a]ll our problems come from 
America.”35
On November 4, 1979, pro-Khomeini radicals seized the U.S. embassy in 
Iran and took sixty-six Americans hostage.
 
36  U.S. President Jimmy Carter 
acted almost immediately by issuing a proclamation imposing a ban on the 
importation of Iranian oil into the United States.37  Two days later, when he 
learned that the Iranians were about to pull all of their assets out of 
American banks, Carter issued an executive order, which blocked all 
property within U.S. jurisdiction owned by the Central Bank and 
Government of Iran, thereby freezing their assets.38
 
 32. KENNETH M. POLLACK, THE PERSIAN PUZZLE:  THE CONFLICT BETWEEN IRAN AND 
AMERICA 134–35 (2004). 
  By April 1980, 
 33. Id. at 131. 
 34. See id. at 145. 
 35. Id. at 146; see also id. at 156 (“Khomeini’s obsessive hatred for the United States 
was a central motivating force in his decision making.”). 
 36. Id. at 153. 
 37. Id. at 164; see Proclamation No. 4702, 44 Fed. Reg. 65,581 (Nov. 12, 1979) 
(“[R]ecent developments in Iran have exacerbated the threat to the national security posed by 
imports of petroleum and petroleum products.  Those developments underscore the threat to 
our national security which results from our reliance on Iran as a source of crude oil.”). 
President Jimmy Carter derived statutory authority to suspend imports of petroleum from 
Iran from Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act. Id. (citing the Trade Expansion Act of 
1962 § 232, 19 U.S.C. § 1862 (2006)).  Section 232 authorizes the President to regulate 
imports of a commodity if the President determines that the commodity “is being imported 
into the United States in such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair 
the national security.” Id. § 1862(b)(3)(A) . 
 38. Exec. Order No. 12,170, 44 Fed. Reg. 65,729 (Nov. 14, 1979); POLLACK, supra note 
32, at 164.  In order to freeze the assets by executive order, the President acted under the 
authority vested in him by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). 
Exec. Order No. 12,170, 44 Fed. Reg. 65,729 (Nov. 14, 1979) (citing the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (2006)).  In order to impose economic 
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President Carter broke diplomatic relations with Iran and issued executive 
orders instituting a total embargo on U.S. exports to Iran, imposing a ban on 
all imports from Iran, and prohibiting U.S. citizens from traveling to Iran or 
conducting financial transactions there.39
These sanctions did not have their desired effect, however, as Iran 
refused to release the hostages.
 
40  As a result of the Iranian intransigence in 
the face of sanctions, President Carter ordered a military rescue attempt, 
Operation Eagle Claw, which ended tragically when a sandstorm caused 
some of the American helicopters to crash in the Iranian desert.41  Eight 
American servicemen lost their lives.42
The Hostage Crisis did not come to an end until President Ronald Reagan 
took office in January 1981.
 
43  On January 19, 1981, the United States and 
Iran signed a negotiated settlement known as the Algiers Accords.44  On 
January 21, 1981, after 444 days as hostages, the American captives were 
finally released.45  Pursuant to the Algiers Accords, the United States 
revoked all of the previous executive orders that prevented oil imports from 
Iran and barred American oil companies from doing business with Iran.46
2.  The Lebanese Civil War 
 
Beginning in August 1982, the United States stationed Marines in Beirut, 
Lebanon as part of an international peacekeeping force during the Lebanese 
Civil War.47  On April 18, 1983, a suicide-bomber detonated a truck packed 
with explosives at the American Embassy in Beirut.48  Sixty-three people 
were killed.49
 
sanctions under the IEEPA, the President must declare a state of national emergency, defined 
by the Act as any “unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or 
substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy 
of the United States.” 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a).  It is interesting to note that, despite the 
requirements of the IEEPA that he do so, President Carter never consulted with Congress 
when imposing sanctions on Iran; nor did Congress insist upon it. HOSSEIN ALIKHANI, 
SANCTIONING IRAN:  ANATOMY OF A FAILED POLICY 53 (2000). 
  Later that year, on October 23, 1983, another suicide bomber 
 39. Exec. Order No. 12,211, 45 Fed. Reg. 26,685 (Apr. 17, 1980) (prohibiting all 
imports from Iran and imposing a ban on travel to Iran); Exec. Order No. 12,205, 45 Fed. 
Reg. 24,099 (Apr. 7, 1980) (imposing an export ban on Iran); POLLACK, supra note 32, at 
167. 
 40. POLLACK, supra note 32, at 166–67. 
 41. Id. at 168–69. 
 42. Id. at 169. 
 43. Id. at 172. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. See Exec. Order No. 12,282, 46 Fed. Reg. 7,925 (Jan. 19, 1981) (revoking previous 
executive orders sanctioning Iran). 
In Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981), the U.S. Supreme Court held that it 
was within the President’s authority under Article II of the Constitution as the country’s 
chief diplomat to negotiate the terms of the Algiers Accords and dispose of claims against 
foreign countries without express authorization of Congress. Id. at 686. 
 47. PATRICK TYLER, A WORLD OF TROUBLE:  THE WHITE HOUSE AND THE MIDDLE 
EAST—FROM THE COLD WAR TO THE WAR ON TERROR 283–84 (2009). 
 48. Id. at 290–92. 
 49. Id. at 291. 
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detonated a truck bomb inside the U.S. Marine Corps barracks in Beirut.50  
A total of 241 American servicemen were killed.51
The pro-Iranian militant Islamist group Hizbollah claimed responsibility 
for both blasts, and American intelligence determined that Iranian officials 
supervised the planning of the attacks.
 
52  The suicide attack on the Marine 
barracks, at the time, caused the greatest loss of American lives in one day 
since Vietnam,53 and led to the withdrawal of American forces from 
Lebanon.54
In response to Iran’s support for Hizbollah and complicity in the Beirut 
bombings, in January 1984, the State Department declared Iran a “state 
sponsor of terrorism.”
 
55  This designation earned Iran a number of 
economic sanctions which effectively denied foreign aid to Iran and denied 
the use of credit guarantees or other financial assistance from American 
parties to be used by Iran in acquiring weapons.56
3.   The Iran-Iraq War 
 
On September 22, 1980, Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi Army invaded Iran.57  
Although the Reagan Administration, following the release of the American 
hostages, came into office wanting to have little to do with Iran, the 
battlefield successes of the Ayatollah’s armies in 1982 caused the 
Administration to fear that the Iranians would drive through Iraq westward 
to Jordan and Israel, or southward into the oil-rich Gulf states.58  In 
response, the United States began to supply Iraq with civilian goods and 
intelligence; and in spite of its arms embargo against both countries, the 
United States began to encourage its European allies to supply Iraq with the 
munitions it needed to conduct the war.59
Throughout the Iran-Iraq War, the Reagan Administration imposed a 
number of economic sanctions against Iran, seeking to further restrict its 
access to goods that could have military purposes and deny its ability to 
finance its war and terror propagation.
 
60  Furthermore, in order to protect 
the oil shipping lanes of the Persian Gulf, which were under attack by 
Iranian-laid mines and Iranian armored vessels, the U.S. Navy got directly 
involved in the war by escorting oil tankers through the Gulf.61
 
 50. Id. at 297–98. 
 
 51. Id. at 298. 
 52. See POLLACK, supra note 32, at 203. 
 53. TYLER, supra note 47, at 298. 
 54. POLLACK, supra note 32, at 205. 
 55. KATZMAN, supra note 19, at 61.  On January 13, 1984, Secretary of State George 
Shultz openly accused Iran of participating in the bombing of the Marine barracks. 
ALIKHANI, supra note 38, at 154. 
 56. ALIKHANI, supra note 38, at 154. 
 57. POLLACK, supra note 32, at 184–86. 
 58. Id. at 233–34. 
 59. Id. at 234. 
 60. ALIKHANI, supra note 38, at 154–56. 
 61. See POLLACK, supra note 32, at 223–27 (detailing the Tanker War). 
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Yet, in spite of Iran’s belligerence and the designation of the country as a 
state sponsor of terrorism, the United States continued to buy petroleum 
from Iran.  By 1987, Iran had become the second leading source of oil for 
the United States.62  In fact, the U.S. Department of Energy was purchasing 
Iranian oil for the Strategic Petroleum Reserve.63
Outraged by the Department of Energy’s purchases of Iranian oil, in 
1987 Congress passed resolutions calling for a ban on Iranian imports.
 
64  
President Reagan, not wanting to be outdone by Congress,65 issued an 
Executive Order on October 29, 1987 prohibiting importation of Iranian 
crude oil and all other Iranian products.66
4.  Clinton Administration Executive Orders 
 
Following the conclusion of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988 and the Persian 
Gulf War with Iraq in 1991, little changed with respect to America’s 
policies toward Iran.67  The United States pursued a policy of “dual 
containment” in which it made multilateral efforts to isolate both Iraq and 
Iran internationally.68  When the Republicans took control of Congress in 
1995 behind new House Speaker Newt Gingrich’s “Contract with 
America,” however, they immediately began to press President Bill Clinton 
to strengthen his policies against Iran.69  At that time, Iran had begun 
aggressively pursuing weapons of mass destruction, was overtly 
undermining American efforts in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, and 
remained the world’s largest state sponsor of terrorism.70  President 
Clinton’s previous multilateral containment strategies had done little to 
persuade Iran to change its belligerent behavior.71  Moreover, in spite of the 
ban still in place from the Reagan Administration,72 by 1995, the United 
States was Iran’s third largest trading partner and the largest purchaser of its 
oil.73
 
 62. See Jonathan Fuerbringer, Senators, 98 to 0, Back Import Ban Against Tehran, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 30, 1987, at A1. 
  Thus, the Clinton Administration appeared hypocritical when trying 
to persuade foreign countries to prevent their companies from doing 
business with Iran while looking the other way as American companies did 
 63. ALIKHANI, supra note 38, at 156. 
 64. Id. at 156; see also Fuerbringer, supra note 62. 
 65. ALIKHANI, supra note 38, at 156. 
 66. Exec. Order No. 12,613, 52 Fed. Reg. 41,940 (Oct. 29, 1987).  To impose the import 
ban on Iran, President Reagan used the statutory authority of the International Security and 
Development Cooperation Act of 1985, § 505, 22 U.S.C. § 2349aa-9 (2006), which prohibits 
imports from state sponsors of terrorism. Exec. Order No. 12,613, 52 Fed. Reg. 41,940. 
 67. For a summary of U.S.-Iran relations during the George H.W. Bush Administration, 
see POLLACK, supra note 32, at 244–59. 
 68. See ALIKHANI, supra note 38, at 166–70 (detailing dual containment sanctions); 
POLLACK, supra note 32, at 259–65 (detailing the policy behind dual containment). 
 69. POLLACK, supra note 32, at 270. 
 70. Id. at 265–70. 
 71. Id. at 270. 
 72. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
 73. POLLACK, supra note 32, at 270. 
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the same.74  This issue culminated when Conoco, an American oil 
company, signed a one billion dollar contract to develop oil fields in Iran on 
March 6, 1995.75
Shortly thereafter, on March 15, President Clinton signed an executive 
order prohibiting all petroleum development deals with Iran by U.S. 
companies, declaring that Iran “constitute[s] an unusual and extraordinary 
threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United 
States.”
 
76  Yet, even this move was criticized as too weak on Capitol Hill 
because the executive order allowed American companies to purchase oil 
from Iran and sell it to third countries—a practice that then accounted for a 
quarter of all oil sold by Iran.77  Hoping to be able to finally take the moral 
high ground in encouraging multilateral sanctions against Iran,78 on May 6, 
1995, Clinton went even further in signing another executive order which 
banned all trade with Iran, including by the foreign subsidiaries of 
American corporations.79  U.S. trade with Iran diminished immediately.80
B.  Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 
 
1.  The Passage of Extraordinary Measures 
President Clinton’s executive orders did not do a great deal to inhibit Iran 
or influence foreign nations; it ironically only ended up hurting the 
American businesses forced to end commerce with Iran.81  As a result of a 
process dubbed “backfilling,” in which companies move into sanctioned 
countries to take over contracts abandoned by companies complying with 
the sanctions,82 the effect on Iran of losing American markets and investors 
was essentially nullified.83  Instead, the Iranians were able to find new 
buyers for their oil at similar prices and new companies to invest in their 
energy sector.84
Some members of Congress were chaffing to extend sanctions even 
further to foreign companies doing business in Iran, which they thought 
would increase multilateral involvement in the sanctions.
 
85
 
 74. Id. 
  The Clinton 
 75. Id. at 271. 
 76. Exec. Order 12,957, 60 Fed. Reg. 14,615 (Mar. 15, 1995).  President Clinton used 
his statutory authority under the IEEPA to impose the sanctions. Id.; see also supra note 38. 
 77. Douglas Jehl, Oil Concern Ends a Deal with Iran as President Acts, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 15, 1995, at A1. 
 78. POLLACK, supra note 32, at 273. 
 79. Exec. Order 12,959, 60 Fed. Reg. 24,757 (May 6, 1995).  In addition to the statutory 
authority vested in the President by IEEPA, see supra note 38, President Clinton relied on 
Section 505 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985 to cut 
off all commerce with Iran by American companies and their foreign subsidiaries, Exec. 
Order 12,959, 60 Fed. Reg. at 24,757; see also supra note 66. 
 80. POLLACK, supra note 32, at 273. 
 81. See id. 
 82. See generally Rogin, supra note 31 (describing practice of backfilling). 
 83. POLLACK, supra note 32, at 273. 
 84. Id. 
 85. See ALIKHANI, supra note 38, at 288. 
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Administration struck a deal with Congressional members to postpone 
consideration of such legislation that had the great possibility of alienating 
many of America’s trading partners in exchange for Clinton’s promise that 
he would pressure U.S. allies at the G7 summit in June 1995 to limit trade 
with Iran.86  Those efforts failed.87
A year later, on June 25, 1996, a truck bomb decimated a building at the 
Khobar Towers complex in Saudi Arabia that was used to house American 
military personnel deployed to defend Saudi Arabia.
 
88  Nineteen Americans 
were killed and another 372 were wounded.89  It was quickly proven that a 
group known as Hizballah al-Hijaz, a thinly-veiled proxy for the Iranian 
Revolutionary Guard that had been trained and equipped in Iran, was 
responsible for the carnage.90
Exasperated with both Iran and America’s allies, Congress acted.
 
91  
Senator Alfonse D’Amato of New York introduced legislation that would 
impose “extraterritorial” sanctions on foreign companies investing in Iran’s 
energy sector.92  The D’Amato bill required the President to impose at least 
two out of a list of six sanctions on foreign companies that invested more 
than $20 million in one year in Iran’s energy sector.93  The law gave the 
President discretion to waive sanctions if the home country of the violating 
firm agreed to impose economic sanctions on Iran, or if the President 
certified that a waiver was “important” to the United States’s national 
interest.94  Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts eventually added 
Libya to the sanctions for its complicity in the Pan Am Flight 103 
bombing,95
 
 86. Id. 
 as well as its more endemic support for terrorism and efforts to 
 87. Id. at 288–89.  The G7 then included Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the United 
Kingdom, and Italy. Id.  The insult to the United States was compounded when the French 
firm Total S.A. took over the $600 million contract that the Clinton Administration 
pressured Conoco to abandon. Id. 
 88. POLLACK, supra note 32, at 282. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 286. 
 92. Id. at 287.  Extraterritorial sanctions “reach beyond U.S. borders to . . . attach 
economic penalties to foreign firms for their dealings with sanctioned countries.  Their aim 
is to broaden the observance of unilateral measures by applying U.S. law to private actors in 
third countries that have not imposed parallel controls.” KENNETH A. RODMAN, SANCTIONS 
BEYOND BORDERS:  MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND U.S. ECONOMIC STATECRAFT 1 
(2001). 
 93. The six sanctions from which the President could choose were:  (1) denial of Export-
Import Bank assistance for exports, (2) denial of export licenses or other specific permission 
under the U.S. export control laws, (3) denial of loans in excess of $10 million in any twelve 
month period from U.S. financial institutions, (4) prohibitions on sanctioned financial 
institutions from designation as a primary dealer in U.S. debt or as a repository of 
government funds, (5) ban on contracts with the U.S. government, and (6) case-by-case 
imposition of import restrictions. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
172, § 6, 110 Stat. 1541, 1545–46 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note). 
 94. § 9, 110 Stat. at 1547–48. 
 95. POLLACK, supra note 32, at 287. 
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acquire weapons of mass destruction.96  Congress passed the bill—entitled 
the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act—on July 23, 1996.97
Many members of the executive branch despised the bill.
 
98  The ILSA 
was designed to proscribe wholly foreign activities by wholly foreign 
entities conducting such activities that were entirely legal in their home 
countries.99  The bill amounted to a secondary boycott of Iran.100  The 
United States had been the staunchest opponent to the secondary boycotts 
imposed upon Israel by Arab countries.101  In fact, Congress had made 
complying with the Arab boycotts a crime for U.S. companies.102  
Furthermore, secondary boycotts were forbidden by the rules of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO).103  For Clinton Administration diplomats and 
economic officials who were fighting to liberalize world trade, the ILSA 
undermined their case for trading partners to lower trade barriers.104
As was often the case, however, President Clinton’s political advisors 
won the day.
 
105  They pointed out that Iran had just killed nineteen 
Americans and was despised by the American public at large, and that the 
bill had passed Congress by such an overwhelming margin that the 
President’s veto could have been easily overridden, thereby making the 
President appear even weaker.106  Others in the Administration saw the Act 
as a useful tool to convince Iran’s trading partners that serious action 
needed to be taken to punish Iran.107  On August 5, 1996, President Clinton 
signed the ILSA into law, stating:  “I can only hope that some day soon, all 
countries will come to realize that you simply can’t do business with people 
by day who are killing your people by night.”108
2.  Challenges from the Inception 
 
The passage of the ILSA infuriated Iran’s trading partners in the 
European Union, Russia, and elsewhere around the world.109
 
 96. § 3(b), 110 Stat. at 1542. 
  The European 
 97. POLLACK, supra note 32, at 287. 
 98. Id. at 287. 
 99. ALIKHANI, supra note 38, at 389 (“Investment in Iranian petroleum resources is 
perfectly lawful for non-US companies outside the United States.”). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 311. 
 102. Id. 
 103. POLLACK, supra note 32, at 287. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 287–88. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 287–88. 
 108. Remarks on Signing the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 and an Exchange 
With Reporters, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1403–04 (Aug. 5, 1996). 
 109. POLLACK, supra note 32, at 288; see also ALIKHANI, supra note 38, at 320 (quoting a 
European ambassador as stating:  “American diplomacy has a taste for embargoes and 
boycotts which we do not share. . . . [W]e have not elected the American Congress, we have 
never voted for it and I do not see why we should let it legislate for the rest of the world.”). 
International furor over extraterritorial sanctions had been sparked earlier in 1996 when 
Congress passed the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, 22 U.S.C. 
§§ 6021–6091 (2006)—better known as the Helms-Burton Act—which was aimed at foreign 
2360 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79 
Union declared the extraterritorial sanctions illegal,110 and passed 
legislation forbidding European companies from complying with the 
ILSA.111  The European Council regulation held that no judgment made 
pursuant to the ILSA by a U.S. court or administrative body would be 
recognized or enforceable in any manner.112  The regulation also obliged 
the officers of European companies to report to the European Commission 
whether their commercial interests were being affected by U.S. actions so 
that the European Union would be fully aware of the pressures the United 
States was exerting on European companies.113  Furthermore, to counteract 
the ILSA’s requirement that the President investigate whether a 
sanctionable act has occurred, the European regulation prohibited anyone 
from providing any information which could facilitate the President in 
making such a determination.114
In October 1996, the European Union initiated formal WTO proceedings 
against the United States over the extraterritorial sanctions.
 
115  The United 
States pressured the European Union to end the proceedings on the grounds 
that the sanctions involved foreign policy and national security issues that 
were outside the purview of the WTO.116  The Clinton Administration 
announced, when the WTO dispute resolution panel was formed, that it 
would not participate in the case on the theory that the United States had 
discretion to determine unilaterally whether the WTO’s national security 
provisions applied.117
Despite the countermeasures imposed by the European Union, not a 
single foreign company entered into a development deal with Iran for over a 
year.
 
118  The mere threat of U.S. sanctions was seemingly having the 
desired effect of deterring companies from investing in Iran.119
 
corporations that were negotiating joint ventures with the state-owned businesses of the 
Cuban government. RODMAN, supra note 
  It was not 
92, at 176–83.  Some of the property involved in 
certain joint ventures had been seized by the Cuban government after the Cuban revolution 
from Cubans who fled to America. Id. at 176–77.  The most controversial piece of the bill 
created a private right of action for U.S. citizens, including naturalized Cubans, to sue 
foreign corporations for trafficking in confiscated property. Id. at 177–78. 
 110. POLLACK, supra note 32, at 288. 
 111. The blocking statute also had application to the Helms-Burton Act. ALIKHANI, supra 
note 38, at 326; Harry L. Clark, Dealing with U.S. Extraterritorial Sanctions and Foreign 
Countermeasures, 20 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 61, 81–83 (1999). 
 112. ALIKHANI, supra note 38, at 326–27. 
 113. Id. at 327. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Clark, supra note 111, at 87. 
 116. Id. at 88. 
 117. Clark, supra note 111, at 88 n.129; see also Paul Blustein & Anne Swardson, U.S. 
Vows to Boycott WTO Panel, WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 1997, at A1 (quoting Stuart Eizenstat, 
the Clinton Administration’s point person for negotiating with the European Union over the 
sanctions, stating that the World Trade Organization (WTO) panel had “no competence” to 
rule on U.S. foreign policy). 
 118. See POLLACK, supra note 32, at 287–88. 
 119. Id.; see also RODMAN, supra note 92, at 187 (“ILSA influenced energy firms with 
significant U.S. business because they recognized that this is an issue with strong 
congressional support and a powerful domestic constituency. . . . Given the uncertainties of 
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until September 1997 that the first project that was determined to be in 
violation of the ILSA was signed, a $2 billion contract for Total S.A. of 
France and its partners, Gazprom of Russia, and Petronas of Malaysia, to 
develop a gas field in Iran.120
Faced with a direct challenge to the enforcement of the sanctions on the 
one hand, and the European blocking statutes and WTO proceedings from 
the European Union on the other, the Clinton Administration was faced 
with a strategic dilemma.  Congress was infuriated by the Total S.A. deal 
and began putting pressure on the Administration to issue sanctions.
 
121  
Earlier that year in April 1997, however, the Administration came to an 
agreement with the EU just days before the WTO formal proceedings were 
slated to begin, wherein the EU agreed to suspend its WTO dispute so long 
as the Administration avoided sanctioning European firms under the Helms-
Burton Act or the ILSA.122  Thus, if the Clinton Administration sanctioned 
Total S.A., it would unravel the negotiated understanding with the EU and 
resume the WTO dispute;123 but if the Administration waived the sanctions, 
according to one Administration official, “every non-American energy firm 
on the globe [was] going to race in after [Total].”124
Seeking to find a common ground that would pacify Congress and avoid 
a trade war with Europe, Clinton finally reached a negotiated compromise 
with the EU on May 18, 1998.
 
125  The European Union agreed to work 
harder to tighten export controls on materials and technology that Iran could 
use to develop weapons of mass destruction.126  Accordingly, the Clinton 
Administration agreed to waive ILSA sanctions for the Total S.A. 
contract,127 and indicated further that EU firms would continue to receive 
such waivers.128  The standoff resulted in a clear victory for the Europeans, 
leaving European companies to invest freely in Iran;129 and once the 
agreement was reached, the floodgates to Iranian investment opened.130
 
U.S. behavior, foreign oil companies initially took a risk-averse approach and held off from 
Iranian contracts.”). 
  
 120. KATZMAN, supra note 1, at 6. 
 121. ALIKHANI, supra note 38, at 329–30 (stating that thirteen senators wrote to President 
Clinton warning that “[a] decision not to sanction will reveal the United States as a paper 
tiger, thus opening the floodgate for future investments and enriching a nation bent on 
buying weapons of mass destruction and funding terrorism”).  
 122. European Union-United States:  Memorandum of Understanding Concerning the 
U.S. Helms-Barton Act and the U.S. Iran and Libya Sanctions Act, U.S.-Eur., Apr. 11, 1997, 
36 I.L.M. 529; see also Clark, supra note 111, at 89. 
 123. See RODMAN, supra note 92, at 187. 
 124. Id. (second alteration in original). 
 125. Id. at 188. 
 126. Id. 
 127. See ALIKHANI, supra note 38, at 330–31.  Secretary of State Madeleine Albright 
stated that the reasons for invoking the “national interest” waiver included increased 
European cooperation on issues of nuclear proliferation and terrorism, and that “granting the 
waiver will prevent retaliation against U.S. firms which the imposition of sanctions would 
probably engender and avoid possible challenges based on claims related to treaties and 
other international obligations.” Id. 
 128. KATZMAN, supra note 1, at 6 & n.7. 
 129. ALIKHANI, supra note 38, at 330. 
 130. POLLACK, supra note 32, at 289. 
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Thus, what deterrent effect the ILSA might have had outside of actually 
imposing sanctions became nullified once companies understood that 
sanctions were not much more than an empty threat. 
C.  The Bush Administration:  Continuation of a Failed Policy 
When President George W. Bush’s Administration began—with several 
former oil executives in senior positions, including the President himself 
and his Vice President—it appeared that the Administration might support 
eliminating energy sanctions against Iran.131  With the ILSA set to expire in 
August 2001, Congress moved early in President Bush’s first term to pass 
laws extending the sanctions.132  President Bush unsuccessfully tried to 
negotiate a lesser extension of two years, but, faced with veto-proof 
majorities in both houses, signed the five-year extension proposed by 
Congress.133
The potential for a rapprochement with Iran, which was considered 
possible following Iran’s initial cooperation against the Taliban in 
Afghanistan after the terrorist attacks of September 11,
 
134 was eliminated 
by President Bush’s January 2002 State of the Union Address, in which 
President Bush included Iran, along with Iraq and North Korea, in an “axis 
of evil” that threatened the United States and free peoples around the 
world.135  Moreover, from the beginning of the War in Afghanistan, sources 
showed that Iran was arming and training terrorists to kill American 
soldiers and giving safe harbor to members of Al-Qaeda.136  Given that 
President Bush argued that the United States would not distinguish between 
terrorists and the states that harbored them, it appeared as if Iran would 
become a prime target for action in the “Global War on Terror.”137
 
 131. Id. at 343.  Reacting to the Clinton-era oil company sanctions in 1996, Vice 
President Richard Cheney, then the Chairman of Halliburton, called the sanctions “self 
defeating,” and remarked that “[t]here seems to be an assumption that somehow we know 
what’s best for everybody else.” Id. 
 
 132. KENNETH KATZMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20871, IRAN-LIBYA SANCTIONS ACT 
4 (2003). 
 133. Id.  President Bush, in his signing statement, did soften the rhetoric of the law which 
he was signing by leaving open the possibility that he would be amenable to discontinuing 
the sanctions should relations with Iran improve:  “I believe that we should review sanctions 
frequently to assess their effectiveness and continued suitability.” Statement on Signing the 
ILSA Extension Act of 2001, 37 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1132 (Aug. 3, 2001). 
 134. See generally MICHAEL A. LEDEEN, THE IRANIAN TIME BOMB 178–98 (2007) 
(detailing U.S.-Iran relations in the period following 9/11); POLLACK, supra note 32, at 343–
352. 
 135. Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union, 38 WEEKLY 
COMP. PRES. DOC. 135 (Jan. 29, 2002) (“States like these and their terrorist allies constitute 
an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world.  By seeking weapons of mass 
destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger.  They could provide these arms 
to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred.  They could attack our allies or 
attempt to blackmail the United States.  In any of these cases, the price of indifference would 
be catastrophic.”); see also POLLACK, supra note 32, at 352. 
 136. LEDEEN, supra note 134, at 180; POLLACK, supra note 32, at 351. 
 137. LEDEEN, supra note 134, at 178. 
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Preoccupied by wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, however, the Bush 
Administration never developed a formal strategy for dealing with the 
Iranian threat throughout its two terms in office.138  As such, the Clinton 
Administration policy of avoiding the enforcement of sanctions under the 
ILSA continued under the Bush Administration as well—and not just for 
firms who were covered by the United States’s trade agreement with the 
European Union.139
Faced again with an expiration deadline for the sanctions in 2006, 
Congress voted for another five-year extension.
 
140  In this legislation, 
however, Congress created a formal reporting structure for Congress to 
conduct oversight to ensure the law was being enforced properly.141  The 
1996 version of ISLA did not create formal investigative guidelines through 
which the President was expected to make his determinations; it merely 
gave to the President the power to sanction parties once he had made 
determinations based on his own discretion.142  In 2006, Congress, although 
using precatory language, sought to close this loophole by providing that 
the President “should” initiate an investigation “upon receipt by the United 
States of credible information” that a party was violating the law.143  The 
amended statute also provided that the President “should” make his 
determinations within 180 days and report to Congress the basis for his 
determinations.144
Despite Congress’s efforts, however, no firms were sanctioned as 
required by the law.
 
145  Yet, other than the May 1998 national interest 
waiver granted by the Clinton Administration, no waivers of sanctions were 
issued to the long list of companies in violation of the law; nor were reports 
of investigations submitted to Congress.146
In addition to all of the oil investments that were signed in violation of 
American sanctions, Iran’s gas sector, which was virtually non-existent 
 
 
 138. See id. at 184 (“[T]he Bush [A]dministration still had no formal Iran policy and, like 
its predecessors, had not effectively responded to the ongoing Iranian war against us.”). 
Perhaps contrary to public perception, President Bush balked at using force to strike 
Iranian nuclear facilities, resisting the urgings of more hawkish aides and commentators such 
as William Kristol of The Weekly Standard and Charles Krauthammer of The Washington 
Post, whom Bush referred to in private as “the bomber boys.” Goldberg, supra note 18, at 
60. 
 139. Aside from European firms, companies from India, China, Russia, and Switzerland, 
among many others, signed development contracts. KATZMAN, supra note 1, at 24–28.  The 
Bush Administration expressed a desire to maintain President Clinton’s multilateral strategy 
of working with the Europeans to persuade Iran to end its nuclear enrichment and support for 
terrorism, and therefore did not want to antagonize them by enforcing sanctions against their 
companies. KATZMAN, supra note 132, at 4. 
140. Iran Freedom Support Act, Pub. L. No. 109-293, § 201, 120 Stat. 1344 (2006) 
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note). 
 141. See KATZMAN, supra note 132, 5–6. 
 142. See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, § 6, 110 Stat. 1541, 
1545 (1996) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note). 
 143. § 201, 120 Stat. 1344, 1345. 
 144. § 201, 120 Stat. at 1345–46. 
 145. KATZMAN, supra note 1, at 6. 
 146. Id. 
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prior to its opening to foreign investment in 1998, has today become an 
increasingly integral part of Iran’s economy.147  What is more, the U.S. 
government has enriched foreign firms who have been in violation of its 
policy on Iran with government contracts.148  In essence, the U.S. 
government has looked the other way at violations of its laws, thereby 
making the sanctions laws ineffectual through non-enforcement.149
II.  THE COMPREHENSIVE IRAN SANCTIONS ACCOUNTABILITY AND 
DIVESTMENT ACT OF 2010 
 
As Part I of this Comment demonstrated, by the time President Barack 
Obama and the 111th Congress entered office in 2009, it was clear that the 
status quo policy with respect to Iran was a failure.  This part discusses the 
efforts of both the President and Congress to reshape the Iran policies of 
America and its international partners, culminating with the passage and 
implementation of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions Accountability and 
Divestment Act of 2010. 
A.  Speaking Softly:  President Obama’s Failed Policy of Outreach 
President Obama’s Administration took office in January 2009, with the 
belief that it had an opportunity for renewed diplomatic dialogue to deter 
Iran from developing weapons of mass destruction and build a constructive 
framework of relations after three decades of hostility.150  In pursuit of its 
“open-hand” policy toward Iran,151 the Obama Administration articulated 
that it would offer enticements such as aiding in the development of Iran’s 
peaceful nuclear energy and helping to integrate Iran into the global 
economy in exchange for Iranian suspension of its nuclear program.152
On March 19, 2009, in a videotaped peace greeting to “the people and 
leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran” on the occasion of the Iranian New 
 
 
 147. Id. 
 148. Jo Becker & Ron Nixon, U.S. Enriches Companies Defying Its Policy on Iran, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 7, 2010, at A1.  Nearly $15 billion was paid to companies that were investing in 
Iran’s energy sector, in direct violation of the ILSA. Id.  Additionally, oil and gas companies 
that have invested in Iran have won lucrative leases to some fourteen million acres of 
offshore and onshore federal land for energy exploration. Id. 
 149. But see U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-58, IRAN SANCTIONS:  IMPACT 
IN FURTHERING U.S. OBJECTIVES IS UNCLEAR AND SHOULD BE REVIEWED 15 (2007) (noting 
that State Department officials contended that the Act “has been useful in raising U.S. 
concerns over Iran” as a diplomatic tool). 
 150. KATZMAN, supra note 19, at 50–51; see also Remarks on Signing the 
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, supra note 2 (President Obama stated:  “Since taking office, 
I’ve made it clear that the United States was prepared to begin a new chapter of engagement 
with the Islamic Republic of Iran.”). But see Michael Ledeen, Op-Ed, We’ve Been Talking to 
Iran for 30 Years, WALL ST. J., Sept. 30, 2009, at A23 (quoting Defense Secretary Robert 
Gates as noting that “every administration since 1979 has reached out to the Iranians in one 
way or another and all have failed”). 
 151. Six days after his inauguration Obama reiterated the sentiments he made in his 
inaugural address by stating that “[i]f countries like Iran are willing to unclench their fist, 
they will find an extended hand from us.” Yochi J. Dreazen & Jay Solomon, Obama Offers 
Open Channels to Pakistan, Iran, North Korea, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 2009, at A10. 
 152. KATZMAN, supra note 19, at 50–51. 
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Year, Obama stated:  “My [A]dministration is now committed to diplomacy 
that addresses the full range of issues before us . . . . This process will not 
be advanced by threats.  We seek instead engagement that is honest and 
grounded in mutual respect.”153  Then, in early April, the State Department 
formally declared that the United States would participate in face-to-face 
negotiations with the Iranians.154  Thereafter, President Obama stepped up 
his efforts toward direct negotiations by writing a letter directly to Iran’s 
supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, expressing a desire to amicably 
resolve the conflict over Iran’s nuclear program and to bring an end to 
decades of hostility between the two countries.155
Although the Iranians never responded directly to any of Obama’s 
overtures, in late May the Iranians successfully tested a rocket capable of 
striking Israel and U.S. military bases in the Middle East.
 
156  Iranian 
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad celebrated the test by declaring:  “In the 
nuclear case, we send them a message:  Today the Islamic Republic of Iran 
is running the show.”157
When the Iranian regime violently suppressed popular protests that arose 
in response to the June 12, 2009 presidential elections that were widely 
thought to be rigged in favor of Ahmadinejad, President Obama vacillated, 
initially refusing to condemn the fraudulent elections or the crackdown that 
followed.
 
158  Only after the graphic scenes of the Iranian repression were 
seen by the world, and only after several European leaders had already 
strongly denounced the Iranian regime, did Obama make a statement 
condemning the violence.159  Nevertheless, Obama did not publicly support 
the opposition,160 and moreover, the President hedged his language by 
assuring the Iranians:  “I’ve made it clear that the United States respects the 
sovereignty of the Islamic Republic of Iran and is not interfering with Iran’s 
affairs.”161  Obama held fast to his policy of outreach toward Iran.162
On September 9, 2009, Iran finally responded to the invitation to 
negotiate—five months after the invitation was proffered—by issuing a 
negotiation proposal which conspicuously ignored issues surrounding its 
nuclear enrichment.
 
163
 
 153. Jay Solomon, Obama Video Message Reaches Out to Iranians, WALL ST. J., Mar. 
20, 2009, at A3. 
  Instead, Iran publicly ruled out any compromise on 
the nuclear issue, insisting that it would never give up its right to a nuclear 
 154. Jay Solomon, U.S. to Join Iran Nuclear Talks, WALL ST. J., Apr. 9, 2009, at A10. 
 155. Jay Solomon & Chip Cummins, U.S. Further Ramps Up Contact With Iran, WALL 
ST. J., Mar. 21, 2009, at A5. 
 156. Chip Cummins, Iran Tests Missile, Launching Pre-Election Show of Defiance, 
WALL ST. J., May 21, 2009, at A8. 
 157. Stephen F. Hayes, Obama Caves to Iran, WKLY. STANDARD, Sept. 28, 2009, at 9. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. President’s News Conference, 2009 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 498 (June 23, 2009). 
 162. Hayes, supra note 157, at 9. 
 163. Farnaz Fassihi & Jay Solomon, Iran Rejects Compromise Over Its Nuclear Program, 
WALL ST. J., Sept. 10, 2009, at A1. 
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program.164  Later that month, the United States revealed publicly for the 
first time that the Iranians were clandestinely enriching uranium at a nuclear 
facility that they were keeping secret from the international community.165  
At this time, Obama’s engagement strategy began to come under serious 
criticism internationally, as French President Nicholas Sarkozy remarked:  
“I support the extended hand of the Americans, but what good have 
proposals for dialogue brought the international community?  More 
uranium enrichment and declarations by the leaders of Iran to wipe a UN 
member state [Israel] off the map.”166
Obama revealed the existence of the secret Iranian enrichment facility in 
the hopes of gaining additional leverage in the face-to-face negotiations 
with Iran—which began on October 1, 2009 in Geneva, Switzerland—by 
uniting the multilateral negotiating group against Iran.
 
167  Joined by the 
other permanent members of the U.N. Security Council—China, France, 
Russia, and the United Kingdom—plus Germany (P5+1), the United States 
offered to forestall efforts to impose increased sanctions in exchange for the 
suspension of Iran’s nuclear enrichment.168  While Iran did not agree to the 
so-called “freeze for freeze” agenda, the Iranian delegation did agree in 
principle to transfer a large amount of its enriched nuclear fuel to Russia 
and France so that the outside countries could enrich it to be used by Iran 
for peaceful purposes.169  While some members of the Obama 
Administration were cautiously optimistic about what Iran’s concessions 
meant for breaking the stalemate, critics saw the concessions—coupled 
with Iran’s refusal to suspend enrichment—as a cynical ploy to buy time to 
avoid sanctions and continue enrichment.170
The critics were right.  Iran very quickly reneged on its offer to ship its 
enriched uranium abroad,
 
171 and the Obama Administration’s year-end 
deadline for negotiations came and went without any progress.172
 
 164. Id. 
  In sum, 
despite the President’s conciliatory attitude, the Iranian regime remained 
intractable throughout the one-year timetable he imposed for 
 165. Jonathan Weisman et al., West Raps Iran Nuclear Site, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2009, 
at A1. 
 166. Goldberg, supra note 18, at 65. 
 167. See Weisman et al., supra note 165. 
 168. Jay Solomon & Farnaz Fassihi, U.S. and Iran Make Offers on Nuclear Talks, WALL 
ST. J., Oct. 1, 2009, at A11. 
 169. Marc Champion & Jay Solomon, Iran Agrees To Transfer Uranium Abroad, WALL 
ST. J., Oct. 2, 2009, at A1. 
 170. See, e.g., id. 
 171. Chip Cummins et al., Iran Seeks to Alter Agreement, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 2009, at 
A13.  The State Department documents released by WikiLeaks in 2010 show that President 
Ahmadinejad was in favor of the deal, but was attacked by the Iranian Parliament. Jay 
Solomon, Offers, Doubts Greet Iran Talks, WALL ST. J., Dec. 2, 2010, at A14.  Iran’s 
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei eventually sided against Ahmadinejad and scuttled 
the deal. Id.  The Austrian diplomat who was the source of this information reported that 
“Iran’s failure to follow through . . . may have been due to a decision by Khamenei either 
that the West was not trustworthy . . . or that Iran could get more.” Id. 
 172. Glenn Kessler, While Protests Roil Iran, U.S. Prepares Sanctions, WASH. POST, Dec. 
30, 2009, at A1. 
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negotiations.173  Instead, Obama’s failed outreach was met with dilatory 
tactics through which Iran bought valuable time in developing a nuclear 
weapon.174
B.  Carrying a Big Stick?:  The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 
 
Toward the end of the one-year deadline for negotiations imposed by the 
Obama Administration, members of Congress began to grow impatient with 
both Iran and the Administration.175  Over the objections of some members 
of the Administration,176 both the Senate and the House introduced and 
passed legislation that was meant to strengthen and expand sanctions 
against Iran that were already in place,177 as well as to pressure the 
Administration to use all the tools at its disposal to achieve results.178  The 
Administration successfully lobbied the House-Senate conference 
committee to delay the completion of sanctions until it could finish its 
efforts in persuading the U.N. Security Council to enact sanctions of their 
own.179  House Bill 2194, The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
Accountability, and Divestment Act, was passed overwhelmingly by both 
houses on June 24, 2010.180  The President signed it into law on July 1.181
The Comprehensive Act greatly expands the scope of sanctionable 
activities beyond previous law so as to include efforts by foreign firms to 
(1) sell, lease, or provide to Iran any goods, services, technology, 
information, or support that would allow Iran to maintain or expand its 
petroleum refineries; and (2) supply refined petroleum products.
 
182  The 
triggering threshold for supplying refined petroleum is a $1 million 
transaction.183
 
 173. See Matthew Lee, Clinton:  New Sanctions on Iran Needed, ASSOCIATED PRESS, 
Dec. 14, 2009, available at http://www.iranenergyproject.org/303/clinton-new-sanctions-on-
iran-needed (quoting Secretary of State Hillary Clinton as remarking:  “I don’t think anyone 
can doubt that our outreach has produced very little in terms of any kind of a positive 
response from the Iranians”). 
  The Comprehensive Act requires that the above listed 
 174. See KATZMAN, supra note 19, at 23–24 (detailing Iran’s nuclear development 
efforts). 
 175. Kevin Bogardus, Democratic Senators Frustrated with State Department on Iran, 
THE HILL (Oct. 6, 2009), http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/61921-dem-senators-
frustrated-with-state-dept-on-iran. 
 176. See id. 
 177. See KATZMAN, supra note 1, at 16–23 (detailing the contents of the House and 
Senate legislation in comparison to the final law). 
 178. See id. at 16 (stating that the House made its policy explicit in the House Bill by 
stating that it “shall be U.S. policy to fully enforce” the ILSA). 
 179. Id. at 13. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id.; see also supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text. 
 182. Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, Pub. L. 
No. 111-195, § 102, 124 Stat. 1312, 1317–19 (codified at amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 
note). 
 183. Id. at 1318. 
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sanctionable activities “directly and significantly” assist Iran in developing 
refining capability or in obtaining refined petroleum.184
The Comprehensive Act further requires that the sanctionable activity be 
done knowingly, defined as either with actual knowledge or where the party 
“should have known, of the conduct, circumstances, or the result.”
   
185  The 
constructive knowledge standard is also extended with respect to the 
ownership and control of foreign subsidiaries by their American parent 
corporations.186  This is a significant extension of corporate liability from 
the previous ILSA which held parent corporations liable only if they 
approved and/or facilitated the prohibited activity.187
These provisions have the potential of bringing many different 
companies into violation of the law, including financial services companies, 
telecommunications companies, shipping companies, insurance and 
reinsurance companies, and steel companies.
 
188
In light of the fact that only one investigation was conducted under the 
ILSA, Congress has sought to strengthen the name-and-shame function of 
the sanctions by mandating that the President initiate an investigation upon 
the receipt of credible information that sanctionable conduct has occurred, 
and that he report a determination to Congress within 180 days.
  The question remains how 
broadly this Administration and future administrations will construe these 
provisions in determining which companies to investigate. 
189  The 
investigation provision was previously optional.190  The President was, 
however, given some diplomatic leeway in conducting investigations by the 
Comprehensive Act.  For one, the investigations remain permissive, as 
opposed to mandatory, until July 1, 2011, a year after the date of 
enactment.191
 
 184. Id. at 1317.  The bill does not define the term “directly and significantly” so this 
remains an important interpretive issue that must be addressed by the Administration. Id. at 
1316–17 (the “directly and significantly” standard is not included in the Act’s definition 
section). 
  Thereafter, the President can request that the imposition of 
mandatory investigations be delayed provided that the President gives 
Congress written reports on the efficacy of his diplomatic efforts to prevent 
 185. Id. at 1317. 
 186. Id. at 1320.  If American corporations are in fact sanctioned for the activities of their 
foreign subsidiaries, it will be interesting to see how courts apply the constructive knowledge 
standard in interpreting how much knowledge parent corporations should have for the acts of 
their subsidiaries.  A discussion of the possible interpretations, however, is beyond the scope 
of this Comment. 
 187. Additional Information for the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act, 61 Fed. Reg. 66,067, 
66,068 (Dec. 16, 1996). 
 188. See Solomon et al., supra note 3.  Although this Comment focuses on the impact and 
efficacy of energy sanctions, the Comprehensive Act also imposes new restrictions 
implemented by the Treasury department on both domestic and foreign financial institutions, 
freezing out of the American financial system those companies that transact with or perform 
financial services for any blacklisted Iranian institution designated for sanction (for example 
the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Central Bank of Iran, and the state-run entities of 
the energy sector). Id.; see also § 102, 124 Stat. at 1331–35. 
 189. § 102, 124 Stat. at 1327. 
 190. See supra notes 142–44 and accompanying text. 
 191. § 102, 124 Stat. at 1326–28. 
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parties and governments from engaging in sanctionable activities.192  
Furthermore, under an additional diplomatic carve-out called the “Special 
Rule,” the President is not required to investigate a party that is no longer 
engaging in the activity at issue or has taken significant steps toward 
stopping the activity.193
In the event the President actually initiate an investigation, either 
voluntarily or by mandate, the Comprehensive Act, at least in theory, has 
made it more difficult for the President to issue a waiver for a company in 
violation.  Under the previous legislation, the President could issue a waiver 
if it was “important” to the United States national interest.
 
194  The 
Comprehensive Act amends that provision, requiring that the President may 
only issue a waiver if it is “necessary” to the national interest.195  Of course, 
given that no President has issued a waiver since the sanctions for the Total 
S.A. project were waived in 1998,196
Additionally, the Comprehensive Act now requires the President to 
impose three different sanctions on violating companies,
 the increased standard may have little 
observable effect. 
197 and has added 
three new sanctions to the previous menu of six from which he must 
choose.198  If implemented, the three new sanctions have the possibility to 
impose a great deal of economic harm on global firms who violate the 
United States’s sanctions policies.  The new sanctions are:  (1) prohibition 
on foreign exchange transactions subject to United States’s jurisdiction; (2) 
prohibition on transfers of credit or payment between, by, through, or to 
financial institutions that are subject to United States’s jurisdiction; and (3) 
prohibition on transacting or exercising any right, power, or privilege with 
respect to property subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.199
In terms of preventing public taxpayers’ dollars from enriching 
companies in violation of the sanctions, the law contains a provision 
requiring companies seeking U.S. Government procurement contracts to 
certify, by conducting an internal evaluation, that neither they nor any 
subsidiary engages in sanctionable activity.
 
200  Furthermore, the 
Comprehensive Act establishes a framework giving state and local 
governments the authority to implement divestment laws that prohibit the 
use of public funds such as pension funds and endowments to invest in, or 
do business with, companies that invest in Iran’s energy sector.201
 
 192. Id. at 1326–27. 
  To 
 193. Id. at 1325. 
 194. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
 195. § 102, 124 Stat. at 1322. 
 196. See supra notes 127–28 and accompanying text. 
 197. § 102, 124 Stat. at 1317–18. 
 198. Id. at 1320–21; see also supra note 93. 
 199. Id. at 1321. 
 200. Id. at 1321–22; see also supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
 201. Id. at 1341–43.  By providing a framework for state and local governments to divest 
from companies investing in Iran’s energy sector, and providing further that such regulations 
will not be preempted by any federal law or regulation, id. at 1343, Congress prevented 
certain constitutional preemption challenges to the state and local ordinances. 
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further encourage divestment from companies enriching the Iranian regime, 
the Comprehensive Act provides a safe harbor provision for asset managers 
by preventing shareholders and trustees from suing them for either 
divesting from or avoiding investing in companies that violate the 
Comprehensive Act.202
In sum, on the surface the amended sets of sanctions are clearly intended 
to force foreign firms to choose between either doing business with Iran, or 
losing all economic interest in and with the United States.
 
203
C.  An International Consensus Tentatively Emerges 
 
As part of his strategy of engagement with Iran, President Obama has 
sought to build a unified multilateral coalition in both negotiating and 
applying pressure on Iran.204
 
In Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000), the Supreme Court 
held that a Massachusetts statute that barred state entities from buying goods and services 
from any party indentified on a state-compiled list as doing business with Burma (Myanmar) 
was preempted by a statute later passed by Congress directing sanctions at Burma. Id. at 388.  
The Court reasoned that the Massachusetts law prohibited some activity the federal law 
allowed, and allowed some activity the federal law prohibited. Id. at 376.  As such, the Court 
found that the Massachusetts law was “an obstacle to the accomplishment of Congress’s full 
objectives under the federal Act,” because it took away some of the President’s discretion in 
applying the diplomatic leverage Congress specifically intended. Id. at 373.  The Divestment 
section of the Comprehensive Act seems written with Crosby in mind. 
  In that regard, the Obama Administration is 
On a related note, the Insurance Commission of California has begun to require insurance 
companies that operate in California to disclose their dealings with Iran and companies that 
invest in Iran. Jaime L. Brockway, California Insurance Commissioner Sues to Stop Iran 
Investments, INS. & FIN. ADVISOR (Nov. 15, 2010), 
http://ifawebnews.com/2010/11/15/california-insurance-commissioner-sues-to-stop-iran-
investments.  The Commission has prohibited any such company from selling insurance in 
California.  Former Insurance Commissioner Steve Poizner claimed legal authority to do so, 
stating that “[s]ince companies doing business with Iran face financial risk, I have the 
authority to protect insurer portfolios from investments in those companies.” Id.  To date 
more than one thousand insurance companies in California have agreed to forgo business 
with the list of fifty companies promulgated by Poizner’s office as doing business with Iran’s 
energy, nuclear, and military sectors. Id.  Additionally, the California Insurance Commission 
has disqualified some $6 billion in holdings by insurance companies in those fifty blacklisted 
companies. Id. 
Because the insurance premiums of private citizens do not seem to fall under the 
definition of assets that states are authorized to divest under the Comprehensive Act, it does 
not appear as if California’s regulations would fall under the authorized umbrella of the 
statute. See § 102, 124 Stat. at 1341–43.  As a result, the regulations could raise some 
preemption challenges under Crosby. 
 202. § 102, 124 Stat. at 1343–44; cf. Amy Deen Westbrook, What’s In Your Portfolio?  
U.S. Investors Are Unknowingly Financing State Sponsors of Terrorism, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 
1151 (2010) (detailing how U.S. investment dollars capitalize companies that do business 
with state sponsors of terrorism, including Iran). 
 203. See Solomon et al., supra note 3 (quoting Representative Ron Klein (D-FL), one of 
the Comprehensive Act’s original sponsors, as stating:  “Foreign companies are going to 
have to make a choice:  Do they want to do business with us or with the Iranians?”). 
 204. See Remarks on Signing the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, supra note 2. 
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having more success than previous administrations in getting international 
allies to go along with the latest round of sanctions.205
On June 9, 2010, the U.N. Security Council passed a binding resolution 
to take aim at Iran’s ability to develop weapons of mass destruction, while 
targeting Iran’s conventional military and Revolutionary Guard Corps for 
the first time.
 
206  The United States wanted to target Iran’s financial, 
insurance, and other industries, but China and Russia—permanent members 
of the Security Council with absolute vetoes over all resolutions—insisted 
that sanctions not impact Iran’s day-to-day economy or foreign trade.207  
The United States was, however, able to insert some language in the 
preamble to the resolution which mentions the link between Iranian Central 
Bank and Iran’s energy sector revenues and the regime’s proliferation 
activities.208  American officials argued that such language was broad 
enough to sanction companies dealing with both the Central Bank and the 
energy sector.209  This gave President Obama the imprimatur of the U.N. to 
sign off on harsh the sanctions passed by Congress, and to encourage allies 
to do the same.210
In contrast to the debacle President Clinton faced when trying to 
convince Europe to join the sanctions against Iran,
 
211 the European Union 
followed on the heels of the passage of the Comprehensive Act in July 2010 
with robust sanctions of its own.212  While they do not go so far as to ban 
importing oil and gas from Iran, or exporting refined petroleum (i.e., 
gasoline) to Iran,213 European sanctions are similar to the American ones in 
that they ban European companies from investing in Iran’s energy sector as 
well as selling goods and services to Iran that could be used in developing 
its energy sector.214  Furthermore, the EU sanctions contain measures to 
deny Iran access to financial markets, freeze the assets of certain targeted 
individuals and entities, and comprehensively ban all military equipment.215  
Because the EU is Iran’s largest partner, the EU measures have a good 
chance of having a significant impact.216
To date—in addition to the European Union—Japan, South Korea, 
Canada, and Australia have all enacted measures to restrict investment in 
 
 
 205. See John Pomfret, Chinese Firms Bypass Sanctions on Iran, U.S. Says, WASH. POST, 
Oct. 18, 2010, at A1 (“The Obama [A]ministration has cobbled together a growing network 
of countries and companies that have announced measures to cut investments in Iran.”). 
 206. See KATZMAN, supra note 1, at 41–42, 45–48 (detailing the provisions of the U.N. 
sanctions resolutions). 
 207. Neil MacFarquhar, U.N. Approves New Sanctions To Deter Iran, N.Y. TIMES, June 
10, 2010, at A1. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. 
 211. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 212. Stephen Castle, Europe Toughens Penalties on Iran for Nuclear Work, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 27, 2010, at A7. 
 213. See KATZMAN, supra note 1, at 43, 45–48. 
 214. See id. at 45. 
 215. See id. at 46–48. 
 216. Castle, supra note 212. 
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Iran’s energy sector.217  Thanks to these new sanctions, many of Iran’s 
suppliers of refined petroleum have ceased business with Iran, and many of 
the companies investing in its energy sector have either pulled out or are 
winding down their operations.218  As a result, China has become Iran’s last 
major remaining trading partner still willing to do oil and gas deals.219
D.  Preliminary Implementation 
 
On September 30, 2010, after its first round of investigations pursuant to 
the Comprehensive Act, the State Department announced that it was 
imposing sanctions on the Switzerland-based Naftiran Intertrade Company, 
a wholly owned subsidiary of an Iranian state-owned company.220  During 
the same briefing, the State Department announced that four major 
European oil companies had pledged to end their investment in Iran’s 
energy sector.221  Such a pledge brought the four companies under the 
“Special Rule” of the Comprehensive Act, which allows companies to 
avoid sanctions by making assurances that they will end their 
investments.222
Although encouraged by the Administration’s willingness to actually use 
the sanctions that are available, many lawmakers on Capitol Hill remain 
more concerned with the companies that were not included in the sanctions 
than the one that was.
 
223
 
 217. Pomfret, supra note 
  The Administration, however, has countered such 
concerns by reiterating that the purpose of the Comprehensive Act is not 
necessarily to impose sanctions per se, but rather to use them as credible 
diplomatic leverage in encouraging countries and companies to pull out of 
205. 
 218. See Energy-Related Companies Ending Iran Ties, FOUND. FOR DEF. OF 
DEMOCRACIES:  THE IRAN ENERGY PROJECT, http://www.iranenergyproject.org/companies-
cutting-ties-with-iran.pdf (last updated Sept. 23, 2010). 
 219. See Pomfret, supra note 205. 
 220. Rogin, supra note 31; see also James Steinberg, Deputy Sec’y of State, Briefing on 
Iran Sanctions Act Implementation (Sept. 30, 2010), available at 
http://www.state.gov/s/d/2010/148479.htm. 
 221. Steinberg, supra note 220 (identifying the four companies as Total S.A. of France, 
Statoil of Norway, Eni of Italy, and Royal Dutch Shell of the United Kingdom and the 
Netherlands). 
 222. Steinberg, supra note 220 (“These companies have provided assurances to us that 
they have stopped or are taking significant verifiable steps to stop their activity in Iran and 
have provided assurances not to undertake new energy-related activity in Iran that may be 
sanctionable.”); see also Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act 
of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-195, § 102, 124 Stat. 1312, 1325 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. 
§ 1701 note).  The exact language of the “Special Rule” provides that the President need not 
investigate a party that “is no longer engaging in the [sanctionable] activity or has taken 
significant verifiable steps toward stopping the activity; and . . . the President has received 
reliable assurances that the [party] will not knowingly engage in [a sanctionable activity] in 
the future.” Id; see also supra note 193 and accompanying text. 
 223. See Rogin, supra note 31 (quoting a joint statement from Senators Joseph Lieberman 
(I-CT), Susan Collins (R-ME), and Jon Kyl (R-AZ):  “We are particularly concerned that the 
majority of the companies that . . . [are] still selling gasoline to Iran are in China.  We urge 
the Administration to complete its own investigations swiftly and enforce the sanctions law, 
comprehensively and aggressively, against any violators.”). 
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Iran.224  Thus, the Administration will apply the formal sanctions available 
to it only after all diplomatic options have been exhausted.225
The Obama Administration has reportedly been engaged in diplomatic 
talks with China to persuade China’s companies to end their business ties 
with Iran, which are enabling the regime in Tehran to skirt sanctions.
 
226  If 
the Chinese are not forced to end their investment in Iran, or worse, if they 
take over projects abandoned by companies in countries that are complying 
with the sanctions, there is great concern that the tentative consensus 
toward sanctions could crumble.227
Nevertheless, the preliminary results of the sanctions demonstrate that 
they are beginning to have their desired effect.  According to members of 
the Obama Administration who testified before the House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs on December 1, 2010, the sanctions have caused an eighty-
five percent drop in refined petroleum imports into Iran, and have cost Iran 
close to $60 billion in foreign energy investments, as well as the technology 
and expertise that come with them.
 
228  Furthermore, Iran has been almost 
entirely frozen out of the international financial system.229  Iran has 
suffered significant economic difficulties since the passage of the 
multilateral sanctions with fears of inflation rising and their currency—the 
rial—becoming devalued.230  There are signs of domestic unrest as the 
Iranian middle class is blaming the regime for the economic difficulties.231  
And, as a sign that the sanctions are not just harming Iran economically but 
causing changes in behavior, the pressures from the sanctions have caused 
Iran to cut back its funding for the terror group Hezbollah by more than 
forty percent.232
 
 224. See Steinberg, supra note 
 
220 (“I found a chance to talk with a number of members 
of Congress who have been very positive about the actions that we’ve taken.  We’ve acted 
fully in accordance with law.  And what they understand is that the goal here is not to 
impose sanctions for sanctions’ sake, but to end companies from doing business within Iran.  
And so we believe the model that we would like to see every company follow, is to follow 
the model taken by the four European firms.”). 
 225. See id. 
 226. See Pomfret, supra note 205; see also Steinberg, supra note 220. 
 227. See Pomfret, supra note 205 (quoting a senior U.S. official as stating:  “What the 
Japanese and European companies are most concerned about is that they’ve left projects that 
are real prizes in Iran.  Their biggest concern is stepping away under pressure and having the 
Chinese go in.”). But see Steinberg, supra note 220 (“[I]n addition to our encouragement of 
people not to undertake so-called backfill type activities, we obviously make it clear to 
others the potential consequences if their firms were to do that in a way that would violate 
[the Comprehensive Act].”). 
 228. Implementing Tougher Sanctions on Iran:  A Progress Report:  Hearing Before the 
H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 111th Cong. 14–15 (2010) (statement of William J. Burns, 
Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs). 
 229. Id. at 22–24 (statement of Stuart A. Levey, Undersecretary of Treasury for Terrorism 
and Financial Intelligence). 
 230. Id. at 32. 
 231. KATZMAN, supra note 1, at 50–51. 
 232. Yaakov Katz, Iran Said To Have Cut Hizbullah Aid by 40%, JERUSALEM POST, Dec. 
16, 2010, at 2 (“Iran has in recent years provided Hizbullah with close to $1 billion in direct 
military aid, but due to the impact of the recent round of international sanctions, the Islamic 
Republic has been forced to cut back on the funding.  The money is used by Hizbullah to 
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When Iran agreed to meet with the P5+1 to negotiate for the first time in 
over a year in December 2010, the Obama Administration became 
cautiously optimistic that the sanctions were beginning to force the Iranian 
regime to accept that continuing nuclear development was not worth the 
severe costs imposed by the sanctions.233  Iran remained intransigent at the 
talks, however, as its negotiator insisted that Iran would never give up its 
right to nuclear enrichment.234  The Obama Administration left the 
negotiations promising to test “Iran’s pain threshold” by refusing to allow 
Iran’s disingenuous efforts of negotiating to undermine the even tougher 
application of sanctions.235
It remains to be seen how the Obama Administration balances all of the 
diplomatic concerns that a successful implementation entails, and whether 
Congressional pressure will have any impact on the Administration’s 
execution of the Comprehensive Act.  Moreover, the true measure of the 
Comprehensive Act’s success will not be in the number of companies that 
end their investment in Iran, but rather in the costs the sanctions exact on 
the Iranian regime.  The metric for success requires that the Iranians 
permanently suspend nuclear development. 
 
III.  ISSUES IN EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION:  A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 
Given its sweeping nature and extraterritorial focus, the Comprehensive 
Act is certain to face a number of inherent structural challenges as it is 
interpreted and applied by the executive branch going forward.  This part 
critically analyzes the legal, political, and endemic policy challenges that 
the Comprehensive Act may face if it is to be implemented as the 111th 
Congress intended. 
 
buy advanced weaponry, train and pay its operatives and establish military positions and 
sustain them throughout Lebanon.”). 
 233. See Glenn Kessler, Clinton Vows ‘Good Faith’ Talks with Iran, WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 
2010, at A8. 
 234. Glenn Kessler, Little Progress Seen as Talks with Iran Come to End, WASH. POST, 
Dec. 8, 2010, at A9.  One senior U.S. official stated that the talks were accompanied by a fair 
amount of “Iranian venting and posturing.” Id. 
 235. David E. Sanger, Harder Push To Stop Iran from Making Nuclear Fuel, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 11, 2010, at A6.  Aside from the precarious economic condition in which the sanctions 
have placed the Iranian regime, the P5+1 may have more leverage over Iran now that it has 
been revealed that the Iranian nuclear development facilities suffered major setbacks when a 
computer worm known as Stuxnet caused Iranian centrifuges to stop working. David 
Crawford & Jay Solomon, Report Says Computer Worm Stymied Iran Nuclear Sites, WALL 
ST. J., Nov. 24, 2010, at A13.  On November 29, 2010, the Iranian nuclear program was 
targeted by another seemingly covert attack when two separate car bombs killed one 
prominent Iranian nuclear scientist and injured another. Farnaz Fassihi, Bombs Target 
Iranian Nuclear Scientists, WALL ST. J., Nov. 30, 2010, at A15. 
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A.  Legal Barriers to Effective Implementation:  Limits to Prescriptive 
Jurisdiction 
1.  Limits from Customary International Law 
Prior to the enactment of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act, economic 
sanctions either directly targeted Iran by preventing the importation of 
Iranian oil into the United States,236 or targeted American corporations by 
preventing them from investing in Iran.237  The Iran and Libya Sanctions 
Act—and the Comprehensive Act which amended it—intentionally went 
beyond domestic enforcement by targeting the overseas activities of foreign 
firms to force those firms to choose between doing business with Iran and 
having access to American markets.238
It is well settled that Congress has the power under the U.S. Constitution 
to enact laws that regulate conduct occurring extraterritorially.
  This section analyzes whether, in 
practice, any potential domestic U.S. legal barriers exist to the prospective 
implementation of the sanctions regime. 
239  The 
Constitution specifically grants Congress broad power to regulate 
commerce with foreign nations, and one component of this grant is the 
power to regulate commerce that occurs beyond U.S. territory.240  Congress 
has used this power to regulate activity of non-U.S. citizens beyond its 
borders in such substantive areas as antitrust, foreign corrupt practices, and 
economic sanctions.241
Under international law, however, a state’s power to regulate an actor’s 
conduct is subject to the limitations of its prescriptive—or legislative—
jurisdiction.
 
242  Presently, American courts limit the extraterritorial 
jurisdictional reach of American laws based on the “effects doctrine,” 
which posits that a country may only regulate conduct of foreign nationals 
that occurs outside that country’s territory if such conduct “has or is 
intended to have substantial effect within its territory.”243
 
 236. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
  Even if such 
 237. See supra notes 76–80 and accompanying text. 
 238. See supra Parts I.B, II.B. 
 239. See Gary B. Born, A Reappraisal of the Extraterritorial Reach of U.S. Law, 24 LAW 
& POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1, 2–3 (1992); see also EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 
(1991) (“Both parties concede, as they must, that Congress has the authority to enforce its 
laws beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States.”). 
 240. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Born, supra note 239, at 4. 
 241. See RODMAN, supra note 92, at 32. 
 242. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 401(a) (1987) [hereinafter 
RESTATEMENT] (defining prescriptive jurisdiction as the power “to make its law applicable to 
the activities, relations, or status of persons, or the interests of person in things, whether by 
legislation, by executive act or order, by administrative rule or regulation, or by 
determination of a court”). 
 243. RESTATEMENT, supra note 242, at § 402; see, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of 
Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945) (“[A]ny state may impose liabilities, even upon 
persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has consequences 
within its borders which the state reprehends.”). 
Throughout much of U.S. history, however, American courts extended the jurisdiction of 
American laws based on a more limited doctrine of public international law known as the 
territorial principle, which holds that absent consent, a state’s sovereignty is exclusive within 
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substantial effects are found however, the jurisdictional reach of American 
laws should not be extended extraterritorially if doing so would be 
unreasonable to the extent that another state has greater interest in 
regulating the activity.244
According to the Charming Betsy canon of statutory construction, 
American courts will not apply a statute in a manner that violates customary 
international law, absent Congress’s clear intent to do so.
 
245  
Notwithstanding the limitations on Congress’s prescriptive jurisdiction 
imposed by customary international law, however, it is well settled that 
Congress possesses the power to enact statutes that violate principles of 
customary international law.246
As such, when examining whether courts will subject a statute to a 
customary international law analysis under the effects doctrine, one must 
look to the statute itself for the unambiguous intent of Congress to extend 
the law to conduct of non-U.S. citizens outside of the United States.
  Thus, in U.S. courts or other domestic fora, 
federal legislation will override any inconsistent rules of international law, 
including rules that place limits on the jurisdictional reach of statutes. 
247  In 
the case of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act and the subsequent 
Comprehensive Act, the intent of Congress is clear.  The laws were drafted 
to specifically regulate the activities of non-U.S. parties conducting 
business with Iran.248
 
its territory. RODMAN, supra note 
  Hence, regardless of whether or not the sanctions are 
impermissibly extraterritorial under the effects doctrine analysis, Congress 
92, at 30–31.  Any attempt by a foreign power to extend its 
laws extraterritorially represented a violation of the state’s territorial sovereignty to enact 
laws as it sees fit. Id. at 31.  Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes stated the legal doctrine 
succinctly in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.—a case in which the Court refused 
to apply the Sherman Anti-Trust Act to the United Fruit Company for its activities in Costa 
Rica and Panama—stating that “the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be 
determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is done.” 213 U.S. 347, 356 
(1909).  The more permissive effects doctrine phased out the territorial principle after World 
War II as American economic interests became more and more globalized and American 
policy makers sought to have those worldwide interests protected by American law. 
RODMAN, supra note 92, at 30–31. 
 244. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 242, at § 403; see also Timberlane Lumber Co. v. 
Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 609 (9th Cir. 1976). 
 245. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (“An act of 
congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations, if any other possible 
construction remains. . . .”); see also F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 
155, 164 (2004) (limiting extraterritorial application of prescriptive jurisdiction in an 
ambiguous statute); RESTATEMENT, supra note 242, at § 114 (“Where fairly possible, a 
United States statute is to be construed so as not to conflict with international law or with an 
international agreement of the United States.”). 
 246. See Born, supra note 239, at 5; see also Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. 
Nahas, 738 F.2d 487, 495 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“Federal courts must give effect to a valid, 
unambiguous congressional mandate, even if such effect would conflict with another 
nation’s laws or violate international law.”); RESTATEMENT, supra note 242, at § 403 cmt. g 
(“If construction of a statute that accommodates the intent of Congress within the limits of 
international law is not fairly possible, the statute is nevertheless valid . . . .”). 
 247. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (“Congress has the 
authority to enforce its law beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States.  Whether 
Congress has in fact exercised that authority . . . is a matter of statutory construction.”). 
 248. See supra Parts I.B, II.B. 
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validly has the authority to regulate the activities of foreign interests doing 
business with Iran’s energy sector. 
2.  Constitutional Limits 
Although it must be granted that Congress has the constitutional 
authority to pass extraterritorial sanctions laws, the Constitution may 
nonetheless prevent their specific application in certain instances.  
According to Gary B. Born’s comprehensive survey on the subject, “either 
the Due Process Clause or the Foreign Commerce Clause might preclude 
extension of federal law to conduct abroad that has only de minimis contact 
with or effect upon the United States or its nationals.”249
Analyzing the minimum contacts prong of the standard with respect to 
the Comprehensive Act, it is clear that each of the nine sanctions options, 
on their face, are designed to affect a sanctioned party’s contact with the 
U.S. economy.
  Pursuant to this 
standard, the Constitution may prevent sanctions from being enforced upon 
parties that do not have a sufficient presence in the United States or whose 
activities—in this case conducting energy-related transactions with Iran—
do not have sufficient effects on the United States or its nationals. 
250  It follows, therefore, that in order for a targeted sanction 
to be effectively punitive under the Comprehensive Act, the U.S. 
government must deprive a party of its economic interests in the United 
States and thus, a fortiori, the sanctioned party must have previously 
“purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within 
the [United States].”251
With respect to the effects prong of the constitutional limitation, Iran’s 
history of bellicosity, which has only increased in recent years as it has 
raced to develop nuclear weapons and undermine the United States’s 
expanded presence in Afghanistan and Iraq, has had a destabilizing effect 
on American interests and has cost American blood and treasure.
  Thus, each of the sanctions, by their very nature 
would pass a deferential de minimis contacts test. 
252  In 
drafting the sanctions, Congress explicitly drew a link between the Iranian 
regime’s ability to conduct energy transactions and its ability to develop 
nuclear weapons and support terrorist groups.253
 
 249. Born, supra note 
  Thus, insofar as the 
239, at 5–6.  The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment 
limits the assertion of personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants in federal courts who do 
not have sufficient minimum contacts with the United States. See Republic of Arg. v. 
Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 619–20 (1992) (applying a Fifth Amendment minimum 
contacts test to a foreign defendant to establish personal jurisdiction in a case arising under a 
federal statute); Born, supra note 239, at 6 n.16.  Similarly, legislation which sought to 
regulate commerce abroad that had no meaningful connection to the United States could 
ostensibly be challenged as exceeding Congress’s power under the Foreign Commerce 
Clause. Born, supra note 239, at 6 n.16. 
 250. See supra notes 93, 199 and accompanying text. 
 251. Weltover, 504 U.S. at 620 (alteration in original) (quoting Burger King v. 
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 252. See supra notes 17–24 and accompanying text. 
 253. See Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-172, § 3, 110 Stat. 1541, 
1541–42 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note).  The preamble to United Nations 
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fundamental purpose of the extraterritorial sanctions laws is to counteract 
and eliminate the Iranian regime’s ability to harm American lives and 
interests by punishing the countries and companies that give Iran the 
funding to do so, the government should prevail in meeting the deferential 
de minimus effects test as well. 
That said, federal courts have never imposed restraints on the specific 
application of extraterritorial laws by finding them unconstitutional,254 and 
only a few lower federal courts have even alluded in dicta to such a 
possibility.255
B.  Political Barriers to Effective Implementation 
  Thus, foreign parties sanctioned under the Comprehensive 
Act are unlikely to find any legal protection—either from the domestic 
application of customary international law or the prohibitions of the 
Constitution. 
1.  The Inter-Branch Conflict:  A Classic Problem of Foreign Relations Law 
In comparison to the delineated roles the Constitution assigns to the 
executive and legislative branches of government in the domestic sphere, 
the Constitution says relatively little in defining and separating the roles of 
the two political branches in managing the country’s foreign affairs.256  
Accordingly, there is often considerable overlap between the powers of 
Congress and the President when it comes to setting policy for the United 
States in foreign affairs.257
 
Security Council Resolution 1929, which preceded passage of the Comprehensive Act, also 
drew such a link. See supra notes 
  As a result, inter-branch conflicts between the 
208–10 and accompanying text. 
 254. See RODMAN, supra note 92, at 32; Born supra note 239, at 6. 
 255. Born supra note 239, at 6; see, e.g., United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 248–49 
(9th Cir. 1990); Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Leb.), 730 F.2d 1103, 1107 n.11 (7th Cir. 1984); 
Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir. 1972). 
 256. See CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 141 (3d 
ed. 2009) (“Constitutional text does not explicitly address many important issues concerning 
the foreign relations authority of the federal political branches.”); EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE 
PRESIDENT:  OFFICE AND POWERS 1787–1984, at 201 (Randall Bland et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984) 
(“[T]he Constitution, considered only for its affirmative grants of powers capable of 
affecting the issue, is an invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign 
policy.”); HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION:  SHARING POWER 
AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 67 (1990) (“One cannot read the Constitution without 
being struck by its astonishing brevity regarding the allocation of foreign affairs authority 
among the branches.”). 
Article I grants Congress the power to declare war, raise armies, regulate commerce with 
foreign nations, and define and punish offenses against the law of nations (i.e. customary 
international law). U.S. CONST. art. I.  Article II of the Constitution makes the President the 
Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, grants him the power appoint ambassadors, and, 
with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate, gives the President the power to 
make treaties. U.S. CONST. art. II. 
 257. See KOH, supra note 256, at 67 (“[T]he document grants clearly related powers to 
separate institutions, without ever specifying the relationship between those powers, as for 
example, with Congress’s power to declare war and the President’s power as commander-in-
chief.”); see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring) (“When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant 
or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone 
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President and Congress have led to many of the constitutional controversies 
in foreign affairs law since the time of the founding.258
Whereas a paradigmatic inter-branch conflict in foreign affairs law 
occurs when the President has acted without the express authorization of 
Congress or the Constitution,
  This section 
analyzes the constitutional inter-branch conflicts created by the 
Comprehensive Act. 
259 the past, present, and future 
implementation of the Iran sanctions laws presents the converse problem:  
Presidential inaction conflicting with Congressional mandates.  On the one 
hand Congress has the power under the Foreign Commerce Clause to pass 
laws to punish trade with Iran,260 and the President has the constitutional 
duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”261  On the other 
hand, the President is the country’s chief diplomat and, as such, responsible 
for the conduct of the United States’s foreign relations—an area beyond the 
institutional competency of Congress.262
 
of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its 
distribution is uncertain.”). 
 
 258. For instance, during the Neutrality Controversy of 1793, President George 
Washington was adamant that the United States stay out of the war that had broken out 
between Revolutionary France and the rest of Europe. BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, supra note 
256, at 12–13.  Washington’s cabinet debated whether or not the President—consistent with 
his powers under the Constitution—had the authority to issue a proclamation of neutrality. 
Id. 
Arguing in the newspapers in the pseudonymous Pacificus-Helvidius debate, Alexander 
Hamilton (Pacificus) posited that the Constitution vested a unitary executive power in the 
President, and among the powers traditionally understood as executive was the power to 
serve as “the organ of intercourse between the Nation and foreign Nations.” Id. at 14.  As 
such, the prerogative to declare the country neutral in foreign conflicts belonged to the 
President. Id. at 15–16. 
In contrast, James Madison (Helvidius) argued that with the power declare war, also came 
the power to choose to not go to war. Id. at 16–18.  The Constitution gave Congress the 
power to declare war, and it therefore followed that the President needed an act of Congress 
to make an official proclamation of neutrality. Id. 
 Washington issued a proclamation of neutrality, but, perhaps to mollify concerns about 
its constitutionality, never included the word neutrality in the proclamation. Id. at 13. 
 259. See, e.g., Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 589 (holding that the President’s Commander-in-
Chief powers did not grant him authority to seize a steel mill during the Korean War when 
Congress had declined to give him such power through legislation); Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. 
(2 Cranch) 170, 177–78 (1804) (holding that the executive lacked the authority to seize 
American vessels sailing away from French ports when Congress had only authorized the 
President to seize American vessels sailing to French ports); Kucinich v. Bush, 236 F. Supp. 
2d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2002) (dismissing a suit by thirty-two members of Congress against the 
President over whether the President could withdraw from a treaty without the authorization 
of Congress). 
 260. See supra notes 239–41 and accompanying text. 
 261. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 4. 
 262. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (“In this 
vast external realm, with its important, complicated, delicate and manifold problems, the 
President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation. . . . 
Congress itself is powerless to invade it. . . . The President is the sole organ of the nation in 
its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations.”) (internal quotation 
marks omitted); see also Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power 
over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 253–54 (2001) (arguing that the Founders intended 
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It is in this respect that the constitutional conflict between the President 
and Congress has arisen over extraterritorial sanctions.  While Congress has 
wanted to see that the laws it passes are enforced,263 the President has been 
reluctant to involve the United States in a trade imbroglio with foreign 
nations.264
Due to separation of powers concerns, courts are hesitant to get involved 
in settling the disputes between the political branches.  For one, a lack of 
standing will prevent members of Congress from suing to enjoin the 
President to enforce the sanctions.
 
265  Additionally, following the political 
question doctrine, courts are reluctant to interject themselves into 
controversies between the President and Congress in political matters such 
as how the President is exercising his discretion in carrying out a law in the 
realm of foreign affairs.266  Consequently, given the institutional 
advantages of the executive branch in foreign affairs,267 successive 
Presidents have thus far seized wide discretion in choosing to not 
investigate companies and enforce sanctions as prescribed by law.268
2.  Past Precedent:  The ILSA & Presidential Inaction 
 
Going back to the first passage of the Act, between the time of its 
enactment in August 1996 and the May 1998 issuance of a national-interest 
waiver by the Clinton Administration, only one investment deal drew the 
investigative scrutiny of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act:  the Total S.A. 
investment to which the State Department granted the waivers.269
 
for all foreign affairs powers not specifically delegated to Congress to be exclusively 
executive). 
  With 
respect to the Total S.A. deal, Representative Benjamin Gilman, the lead 
 263. See supra note 223 and accompanying text. 
 264. See supra notes 127–28 and accompanying text. 
 265. See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 829–30 (1997) (holding that Congressmen lacked 
standing to challenge the Line-Item Veto Act as unconstitutional because they had not 
suffered a legally cognizable injury); Kucinich, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 6–12 (following Raines, 
dismissed suit by Congressmen for lack of standing). 
 266. The political question doctrine dates back to the seminal case of Marbury v. Madison 
in which Chief Justice John Marshall stated that some government actions are “mere 
political act[s]” and are therefore not “examinable in a court of justice.” 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 
137, 164–65 (1803).  The political question doctrine is often invoked in cases in which 
courts refuse to exercise jurisdiction in suits involving foreign affairs. See BRADLEY & 
GOLDSMITH, supra note 256, at 58.  In Goldwater v. Carter, Justice William Rehnquist 
argued that a suit by Senator Goldwater concerning the President’s power to abrogate a 
treaty should be dismissed as a nonjusticiable political question “because it involves the 
authority of the President in the conduct of our country’s foreign relations and the extent to 
which the Senate or the Congress is authorized to negate the action of the President.” 444 
U.S. 996, 1002 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
 267. See BRADLEY & GOLDSMITH, supra note 256, at 173 (discussing the executive 
branch’s institutional advantage as having control over “a massive bureaucracy devoted to 
foreign affairs”); CORWIN, supra note 256, at 201 (positing that the executive’s institutional 
advantages over Congress include “the unity of the office, its capacity for secrecy and 
dispatch, and its superior sources of information; to which should be added . . . that it is 
always on hand and ready for action”). 
 268. See supra notes 145–46 and accompanying text. 
 269. POLLACK, supra note 32, at 289. 
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House sponsor of the law,270 tried to assert congressional authority in the 
face of presidential inaction.271  Using the unambiguous language of the 
Constitution, Gilman stated:  “Mr. President, refusing to enforce the law in 
this case is not an option, not least because your oath of office requires you 
to see that the law is faithfully executed.”272  In spite of Gilman’s 
admonitions, however, once it became clear that President Clinton and his 
successors were not willing to risk international trade disputes to enforce 
sanctions against foreign companies, the threat of sanctions lost 
credibility.273  Foreign investment in Iran returned to normal.274
Subsequently, as required by the ILSA, the State Department reported to 
Congress every six months on the developments of the ILSA, frequently 
noting that U.S. diplomats had raised concerns with companies and their 
parent governments about investing in Iran.
 
275  Yet, no companies were 
specifically mentioned, nor were any investment projects published in the 
Federal Register as required by the law.276  As such, the formal 
investigation and reporting procedures of the ILSA were never 
subsequently implemented, nor was the President ever forced to issue 
another waiver of sanctions.277
3.  Congressional Initiative:  Signs of a Change? 
  Hence, the public and political pressure that 
would have been placed on the President to sanction companies in violation 
never manifested itself due in part to the structural loopholes of the law. 
Congress sought to close some of the loopholes in the law by reducing 
executive discretion and making certain other provisions mandatory.  As 
amended, the law now requires the Administration to initiate an 
investigation into the possible imposition of sanctions upon the receipt of 
“credible information” that a party is engaged in sanctionable activity.278  
Further, once an investigation has been initiated, the President must 
determine within 180 days whether the party under investigation is eligible 
for sanctions and notify Congress of its determination.279  Congress did 
give the President some diplomatic flexibility by allowing President to 
avoid investigating a party if the party stops, or takes significant steps to 
stop, the sanctionable activity.280
If the President does in fact follow the letter of the law and investigates 
companies investing in Iran’s energy sector or selling refined petroleum to 
Iran, the law now mandates that the President impose at least three different 
 
 
 270. ALIKHANI, supra note 38, at 299. 
 271. Id. at 329. 
 272. Id. 
 273. POLLACK, supra note 32, at 287. 
 274. Id. at 289. 
 275. KATZMAN, supra note 1, at 6. 
 276. Id. 
 277. Id. at 20–21. 
 278. Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010, Pub. L. 
No. 111-195, § 102, 124 Stat. 1312, 1325 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1701 note). 
 279. Id. 
 280. Id. 
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sanctions on the violating party.281  Furthermore, whereas when Secretary 
of State Albright issued a waiver of sanctions in 1998 she had to justify that 
doing so was “important to the national interest,”282 as currently amended, 
the President may only waive sanctions now if it is “necessary to the 
national interest,” and further if the President provides a detailed report to 
Congress on the party’s prohibited activities.283  This may not prevent the 
President from waiving sanctions, but it will provide the Administration 
less leeway in justifying its waivers to Congress and the public.284
In spite of the stricter language of the sanctions as amended by the 
Comprehensive Act, the Administration is still free to implement the law at 
its discretion based on its own independent interpretation of the law.  For 
instance, in the State Department’s first public briefing on how it was 
implementing the extraterritorial sanctions of the Comprehensive Act on 
September 30, 2010, Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg attempted 
to allay congressional concern that the Administration was not sanctioning 
firms with significant ties to Iran.
 
285  Steinberg stated that some of the 
instances did not reach the “threshold question about whether there’s 
credible evidence of sanctionable activity.”286  Moreover, Steinberg alluded 
to ongoing negotiations with companies and their home countries about 
withdrawing from Iran.287
As of this writing, no foreign company that is not wholly-owned by Iran 
has been sanctioned by the Administration, despite the purported limits on 
the President’s discretion.  Hence, Congress’s attempt to set policy through 
its legislative powers failed again to overcome the President’s diplomatic 
supremacy in shaping foreign affairs policy.  Alternatively, for Congress to 
see its policies effectively implemented, it can still bring to bear upon the 
President its institutional powers of political pressure, oversight, and 
investigation. 
 
In the months since the passage of the Comprehensive Act, the 
Congressional committees with jurisdictional oversight for the sanctions—
including the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Senate 
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs—have conducted 
hearings in which members of the Administration had to answer for the 
manner in which the executive branch was implementing the 
Comprehensive Act.  Moving forward, Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen 
(R-FL), the chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee in the 112th 
 
 281. Id. at 1319. 
 282. See supra notes 94, 127 and accompanying text. 
 283. § 102, 124 Stat. at 1322. 
 284. See Lauren Rozen, Congress Cool to Iran Sanctions Waivers, POLITICO (June 11, 
2010, 2:01 PM), http://www.politico.com/blogs/laurarozen/0610/Congress_cool_to_Iran 
_sanctions_waivers.html (quoting Sen. Ben Cardin (D-MD), stating:  “The president wants, 
as any president wants, flexibility in this legislation, and I understand why they want 
that. . . .  But this is a situation and this is an issue where we are not going to give them all 
the waivers they want . . . . It can be helpful for the administration to say ‘well, I wish I 
could do something, but Congress is independent and they have required this.’”). 
 285. Steinberg, supra note 220. 
 286. Id. 
 287. Id. 
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Congress, has stated that Iran will be the Committee’s “No. 1, No. 2 and 
No. 3 priority,” and has expressed a keen interest in using the Committee’s 
oversight powers to reverse the trend that has seen “[t]he bills that we pass 
become interesting historical documents but not really bills that have been 
implemented.”288  Additionally, outside of the formal committee structure, 
several members of the House have formed a bipartisan Working Group on 
Iran Sanctions Implementation in order to hold the Administration to 
account for effectively implementing the sanctions,289 while numerous 
senators have taken the Administration to task for its evasiveness in 
implementing the legislation.290
All told, the legislators who have sought to get out in front of this issue 
have done so with an understanding of the institutional weakness of 
Congress in the realm of foreign relations laws.
 
291  In the words of Senator 
Christopher Dodd (D-CT), the lead Senate sponsor of the Comprehensive 
Act, “as a coequal branch of government . . . we delegate to the 
administration and the executive branch to conduct foreign policy, and you 
can’t have 535 Members of Congress conducting foreign policy, I 
understand that point.”292
C.  Endemic Barriers to Effective Implementation 
  Nonetheless, it is clear from the tone of the 
members of both houses of Congress, from both political parties, that the 
legislative branch has found a renewed seriousness in seeing that foreign 
companies do not violate American sanctions laws with impunity.  It 
remains to be seen whether the political pressure coming from Congress 
will have any effect on how the Administration conducts its diplomacy and 
implements the law. 
Questions remain as to whether the multilateral energy sanctions regime 
the United States and its allies have constructed have, by their very nature, 
any possibility of being successful in bringing Iran back to the negotiating 
table over its nuclear programs.  The endemic issues the sanctions policy 
faces are two-tiered:  (1) sanctions of this kind have not been enforced in 
the past and therefore lack the credibility to serve as a future deterrent; and 
(2) even if the sanctions do sufficiently deter investment in Iran, they are 
 
 288. Bridget Johnson, The World from the Hill:  Iran ‘No. 1’ on Agenda for Foreign 
Affairs Panel Leader, THE HILL (Dec. 19, 2010, 8:32 PM), http://thehill.com/news-by-
subject/foreign-policy/134423-incoming-foreign-affairs-chairwoman-has-iran-no-1-no-2-
and-no-3-on-to-do-list. 
 289. See Press Release, Rep. Howard Berman (D-CA), Reps. Berman, Ros-Lehtinen 
Announce Launch of Bipartisan Working Group on Iran Sanctions Implementation (Aug. 3, 
2010), available at http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/ca28_berman/Iran_Sanctions_ 
WG_forms.shtml. 
 290. See Rogin, supra note 31. 
 291. See Johnson, supra note 288 (quoting Representative Ros-Lehtinen as remarking 
that Congress “can’t force the administration” to investigate companies and impose 
sanctions); see also infra note 292 and accompanying text. 
 292. Minimizing Potential Threats from Iran:  Administrative Perspectives on Economic 
Sanctions and Other U.S. Policy Options:  Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 31 (2009), (statement of Sen. Christopher Dodd, 
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not effective enough to cause the Iranian regime to change course.  This 
section analyzes the possibility of overcoming these problems for the 
sanctions to achieve their objective of causing Iran to determine that costs 
of nuclear enrichment outweigh their benefit. 
1.  Sanctions Lack Credibility 
While the United States has taken the lead in working with its allies 
around the world to reduce business ties with Iran, there is an acute concern 
on Capitol Hill that as countries pull out of Iran, other countries—China in 
particular—will move in to take over the abandoned projects.293  When the 
United States banned companies from doing business with Iran during the 
Clinton Administration, the sanctions only had a harmful effect on Iran for 
as long as the deterrent threat of those sanctions on foreign companies 
remained credible.294  Once they lost their credibility, foreign firms ignored 
them with impunity.295  Insofar as Iran was not damaged by the sanctions, 
they were self-defeating; the only harm came to the companies—such as 
Conoco—that had to sacrifice lucrative business deals that enriched foreign 
firms (e.g. Total S.A.).296
Presently, countries who have signed on to the sanctions will be watching 
to follow America’s lead.
 
297  If the Obama Administration does not enforce 
the sanctions on violating firms, the detrimental effect could be two-fold:  
(1) the Iranians will continue to have gasoline suppliers and foreign direct 
investors in their energy sector thereby nullifying any disincentive to 
continue their nuclear program, and (2) the tentative international consensus 
toward sanctions could crumble as U.S. allies refuse to enforce their own 
sanctions when they perceive the futility of depriving their corporations—
and their tax coffers—of business opportunities.298
The preliminary returns on this front are promising, though far from 
perfect.  As a result of sanctions-related pressure, a plethora of foreign 
companies from around the world have either ended their business dealings 
with Iran or pledged to do so in the immediate future.
 
299  Consequently, 
Iran’s refined petroleum imports have dropped by 85%, and Iran has lost 
some $60 billion in foreign investments.300  And this is in spite of the fact 
that, as of this writing, no non-Iranian firm has been formally sanctioned.301
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This is a sign that in many areas of the world, the sanctions are being taken 
seriously as a credible deterrent, and that the United States need not, in the 
words of Deputy Secretary of State Steinberg, “impose sanctions for 
sanctions’ sake” to achieve their policy objectives.302
It appears, however, that the main credibility problem remains with 
China.
 
303  Chinese firms have not only signed large development deals with 
Iran on their own, but they have also back-filled projects abandoned by 
firms in compliance with the sanctions.304  This leaves the Obama 
Administration with a difficult choice:  to sanction the Chinese firms that 
are in violation of the Comprehensive Act and face the political costs of 
China’s response, or to ignore the violations and make it less likely that 
America’s allies will force their companies out of Iran.305
The Obama Administration has remained ambiguous and diplomatic 
about the measures it has taken with respect to Chinese violators.
 
306  
Although China has increased its investment in Iran’s energy development, 
not wanting to be tied to a country whose decaying capacity may not be 
able to meet its future energy demands, China has simultaneously hedged 
its reliance on Iranian petroleum imports.307  This is a good sign.  
Congressional pressure is mounting, however, for the Administration to 
enforce the sanctions laws against China,308 and it may, perhaps, make the 
difference between having a successful sanctions policy on the one hand, 
and being resigned to a world with a nuclear-armed Iran on the other.309
2.  Sanctions Lack Strength 
 
Even if the United States and its coalition of willing partners are able 
keep their companies from doing business with Iran, the question remains 
as to whether cutting Iran off from imported gasoline or investment in its 
energy sector will inflict enough pain on the regime to achieve their 
objectives.  Some critics of the sanctions policy argue that they may only 
further entrench the Iranian regime by giving it a credible reason to blame 
the United States for the hardships of Iranians.310
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short of military force will cause the Iranians to take the costs of enrichment 
seriously because Iran may be far enough in its nuclear development 
process that the sanctions, which may take some time to exact a crippling 
blow, will not act dramatically enough to keep Iran from attaining weapons 
of mass destruction.311  The Obama Administration has remained steadfast, 
however, that following the dual-track of inflicting punitive sanctions while 
remaining open to negotiations will be the most successful course to 
follow.312
Early signs of the sanctions success are promising, as they are causing 
pain throughout Iran’s economy and pockets of domestic unrest continue to 
emerge.
 
313  Given the repressive nature of Iran’s regime, however, it cannot 
be expected to capitulate just on the basis of internal factors alone.314  To 
counter the sanctions effectiveness the regime has ended consumer 
subsidies and increased levels of security forces to control dissidents.315  
Instead, as the Obama Administration has acknowledged, the Iranian 
regime must be pushed further to the brink—to the point where the 
government’s survival is put in jeopardy.316
As of this writing, the Administration has not yet indicated the steps it 
will take to radically alter Iran’s political calculus.
 
317  While it has stressed 
that all options are on the table when it comes to preventing Iran from 
acquiring a nuclear weapon,318 there seems to be almost no palate for the 
two options that would most critically damage Iran’s nuclear enrichment:  a 
full international embargo of Iran’s oil, or a military strike against Iran.319  
The Stuxnet computer worm and the covert strike against two of Iran’s 
leading nuclear scientists probably bought the Administration some time,320
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but as of now, the two sides remain at a stalemate with no indication that 
Iran will change course despite the effectiveness of the sanctions.321
 IV.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
With the understanding that a crippling, multilateral sanctions regime 
targeting Iran represents the last, best hope of peacefully preventing Iran 
from acquiring nuclear weapons, both Congress and the President will have 
to play important roles in shaping how America’s policy is implemented 
going forward.  This part proposes a number of policy recommendations for 
both of the political branches as they continue to struggle with the 
challenges posed by Iran. 
A.  The President 
As the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. military, the country’s chief 
diplomat, and the executive officer responsible for enforcing American 
sanctions laws, the President has the responsibility of ensuring that the full 
weight of his resources are used to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear 
weapons.322
1.  Iran 
  The President’s strategy will have to be multi-faceted—
oftentimes requiring delicacy, but sometimes the use of a big-stick—and 
concentrated on two fronts:  (1) Iran, and (2) America’s allies and Iran’s 
trading partners.  This section discusses potential policy options on both 
fronts with an eye toward making the U.S. sanctions laws effective. 
President Obama’s open-handed diplomatic strategy has demonstrated 
that engagement with Iran has costs.323  Face-to-face negotiations have lent 
the Iranian regime legitimacy, prestige, and domestic credibility; have made 
the regime appear as a falsely sincere counterparty in negotiations; and have 
bought the regime more time to enrich nuclear fuel and avoid harsher 
sanctions by holding out the opportunity for further negotiations.324
Moreover, when it comes to negotiating with the Iranians, the 
Administration should insist upon dealing with parties who are actually 
empowered to forge an agreement.  Too much time and effort has been 
wasted thus far by the P5+1 in negotiating with diplomats who are 
powerless to come to meaningful agreements while the Supreme Leader, 
Ayatollah Khamenei, is the real center of power.
  Going 
forward, the President should be wary of Iranian dilatory tactics and not 
premise the softening of sanctions upon these insincere offers to negotiate. 
325
At this stage in Iran’s enrichment process, the objectives for the United 
States in negotiating with Iran should be different from the “freeze for 
  Unless the Supreme 
Leader is behind the negotiations, they will continue to be meaningless. 
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freeze” deal the two sides tentatively agreed upon in 2009.  Under that 
agreement, Iran would suspend some nuclear enrichment and export it out 
of the country to be reprocessed while the United States would suspend its 
sanctions.326  The Iranians have repeatedly shown that they cannot be 
trusted when it comes to nuclear monitoring,327
Instead, with the continued leverage from the sanctions which are 
decimating Iran’s economy,
 and thus, conceding any 
enrichment capacity to the Iranians could very well be conceding to a 
bomb. 
328 the Administration should insist upon a full 
suspension of enrichment by Iran.  Using these sanctions, as well as 
additional measures which he could request from Congress,329 the 
Administration should force the Iranian regime to choose between ending 
enrichment or destroying much of its energy sector, the revenues of which it 
requires for its political survival.330  The Administration has already said 
that it plans to increase economic pressure on Iran in order to test “Iran’s 
pain threshold.”331
Lastly, the President should continue to make clear to the Iranian regime 
that the United States will not allow Iran to attain nuclear capability under 
any circumstances, and that all options—including military ones—are on 
the table.
  That pain, whatever form it takes, should be inflicted in 
earnest before the next round of negotiations. 
332  While a negotiated settlement is always preferable, and 
increased sanctions remain the last best hope of reaching such a settlement, 
the Iranian regime must feel sufficiently threatened to relinquish its quest 
for nuclear weapons.333
2.  America’s Allies and Iran’s Trading Partners 
  The sanctions, which are beginning to cripple the 
Iranian economy, coupled with the credible threat of force against Iran, 
could finally lead the Iranian regime to believe that its nuclear pursuit may 
destroy it. 
As the history of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act has shown, the key to 
having an effective sanctions policy is having multilateral partners invested 
in it.334
With respect to America’s allies, more than at any time in the past, there 
is now greater acknowledgement around the world of the seriousness of 
  Accordingly, the Administration must play a critical role in 
persuading countries that have not curtailed their energy partnerships with 
Iran to do so, and further, in persuading the countries that have 
implemented sanctions to enforce them and extend them further. 
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Iran’s impending nuclear development and the role that investment in Iran’s 
energy sector plays in funding that nuclear development.335  Now that the 
Europeans and other major economies such as Japan, South Korea, Canada, 
and Australia have taken the first step toward undermining the long-term 
viability of Iran’s energy sector by prohibiting investment therein,336
Moreover, the Administration should continue to put diplomatic pressure 
on its allies and their private companies to adhere to the sanctions they 
already have in place.
 the 
Administration should encourage its allies to take the next step in raising 
the short-term costs of nuclear proliferation by the Iranian regime by 
instituting sanctions on par with those imposed by the United States. 
337
On this point, one of the key factors in convincing America’s allies not 
only to enforce their sanctions but also to expand them will be the 
leadership role the Administration takes in enforcing American sanctions 
against violators in non-cooperative countries.
  If such private companies continue to invest in 
Iran’s energy sector despite the sanctions in place in their home countries, 
the Administration should insist those countries sanction the companies, 
lest the United States do so itself. 
338  As complying companies 
have wound down their investments in Iran, Chinese companies have 
moved in to back-fill those contracts.  Foreign governments will be uneager 
to enforce sanctions against their own companies if doing so will only 
enrich others.339  Right now there is a strong international consensus 
towards sanctions, but it may not continue if the sanctions only appear—in 
the words of former Vice President Cheney, in his previous life as an oil 
executive—“self-defeating.”340
The Administration should continue to use diplomatic channels to 
vigorously discourage the Chinese and non-compliant companies from 
taking over abandoned contracts and entering new ones.
 
341  Furthermore, if 
it has not already done so, the Administration should commence the formal 
investigation procedures of the Comprehensive Act with respect to the 
companies about which it has “credible evidence” of sanctionable 
activities.342
Notwithstanding the complicated and sometimes precarious trade 
relationship between China and the United States, there is a long set of 
  The Administration can use these formal investigations as 
added leverage to give the violating parties an out under the “special rule” 
which allows a waiver of sanctions for companies that pledge to end their 
investment.  If this fails, the Administration should actually impose 
sanctions on the violating parties such that they are truly forced to choose 
between investing in Iran and having access to the American economy. 
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precedents for the United States imposing sanctions on Chinese companies 
and individuals over counter-proliferation issues.343  Chinese oil companies 
need access to American financial markets, natural resources, and 
intellectual capital more than the United States needs them.344  
Understanding that the purpose of implementing the Comprehensive Act is 
not to impose sanctions for the sake of imposing sanctions,345 history has 
shown nonetheless that at some point violators need to be punished if the 
sanctions are to be taken seriously.346
B.  Congress 
  It could be the key to holding the 
international coalition together and landing a crippling blow to the Iranian 
regime. 
Insofar as Congress has already done the work of drafting and enacting a 
sweeping set of sanctions designed to isolate the Iranian regime, most of the 
activity to apply leverage and pressure to bring an end to Iranian nuclear 
enrichment will take place in the executive branch.  That does not mean, 
however, that Congress should be relegated to an entirely passive role in 
preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and funding terrorist 
groups.  Instead, through its core constitutional competencies of oversight 
and legislation, Congress should ensure that the President is properly 
enforcing the sanctions that he currently has at his disposal, and that the 
President is given expanded options to meet a changing policy landscape. 
1.  Oversight and Investigation 
Congress has an obvious interest in seeing that the laws it passes are 
“faithfully executed,” yet it is beyond Congress’s power to force the 
Executive to investigate violations or apply sanctions.347  What Congress 
can do, however, is to conduct oversight hearings through the committee 
structure of Congress to make the Administration accountable for its actions 
vis-à-vis the sanctions laws and put political pressure on the President to 
enforce those laws in a manner consistent with the national interest.348
Representative Ilena Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), chair of the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee in the 112th Congress, has stated that Iran will be the 
Committee’s “No. 1, No. 2 and No. 3” priority, which is a good sign.
  In 
this respect, much of Congress’s role will be shaped in reaction to how the 
President executes the law. 
349
 
 343. See Dubowitz & Grossman, supra note 
  
297, at 29–34 (listing ninety Chinese entities 
that have been sanctioned by the United States between 1991 and 2010). 
 344. See id. at 11–27 (detailing the presence of Chinese energy firms in American 
markets); Mark Dubowitz, Put China To A Choice:  Tehran or Texas, FORBES.COM (Oct. 17, 
2010, 8:51 PM), http://blogs.forbes.com/energysource/2010/10/17/put-china-to-a-choice-
tehran-or-texas/. 
 345. See supra note 224 and accompanying text. 
 346. See supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
 347. See supra Part III.B. 
 348. See supra note 288 and accompanying text. 
 349. Johnson, supra note 288. 
2011] U.S. ENERGY SANCTIONS & IRAN 2391 
According to Representative Ros-Lehtinen, she and her colleagues intend to 
prevent the Comprehensive Act from becoming another “interesting 
historical document[]” that goes unimplemented by the President by 
conducting “oversight hearings that will ask the administration, ‘Why aren’t 
you sanctioning more banks and companies and countries?  What are we 
doing and what are you waiting for?’”350
During these hearings, Congress should use the open-source reporting on 
Iran’s energy sector available from the Government Accountability Office, 
the Congressional Research Service, the media, and other assorted outlets to 
present the Administration with “credible evidence” of sanctionable 
activity,
  Such hearings should be 
conducted with the same searching objectives by Representative Ros-
Lehtinen’s counterparts in the Senate as well. 
351 which would require further investigation according to the 
law.352
Moreover, the Comprehensive Act contains a number of formal oversight 
mechanisms that require the President to report to Congress on the 
Administration’s efforts to discourage sanctionable involvement with 
Iran.
  In this respect, Congress should continue to insist that the 
Administration explain its interpretation of the credible evidence standard 
and whether or not it had commenced investigations into parties about 
which credible evidence existed. 
353  Depending upon the President’s reports, the Comprehensive Act 
may require the President to conduct mandatory investigations into 
countries and companies in apparent violation of the law.354
If it becomes clear that the President’s diplomatic negotiations have 
proven unsuccessful, however, the investigatory latitude given to the 
President should not be indefinite.  Only then should the mandatory 
investigation provision be triggered.  In a circumstance where an 
investigation yields parties in violation of the law, the President would not 
be backed into an inescapable corner because he could still issue a waiver to 
the sanctions as President Clinton did in 1998.
  Should the 
President request a temporary postponement of the investigations for 
diplomatic reasons as the law allows, Congress should be sensitive to 
giving the President such diplomatic flexibility without unnecessarily 
embroiling the United States in a difficult situation with countries such as 
China and Russia. 
355  If such a waiver is issued, 
again Congress should hold the President accountable for explaining his 
understanding of the “necessary to the national interest” standard.356
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2.  Legislation 
Although the Comprehensive Act represented, in the words of President 
Obama, “the toughest sanctions against Iran ever passed by the United 
States Congress,”357 there are still policy actions Congress can take to react 
to the dynamics of the Iranian problem that have evolved in the months 
since the Act’s passage.  On the one hand, America’s allies around the 
world have proven more amenable to adopting economic sanctions against 
Iran than at any time in the past.358  On the other hand, in spite of the pain 
the current sanctions are causing to the Iranian treasury, Iran remains 
immovable in its refusal to negotiate over its nuclear enrichment 
program.359
In order to sufficiently change the Iranian regime’s political calculus, 
Congress should create policy that will ratchet up the pain on the Iranian 
regime to the point that it fears for its survival.
  Congress can once again take the lead in refining the scope of 
sanctions to increase the pressure on Iran and to further encourage allies to 
cut ties with Iran. 
360  To do so, Congress 
should take aim at Iran’s Achilles’ heel:  its dependence on revenues from 
oil exports.361  An absolute extraterritorial ban on purchasing Iranian crude 
(i.e., an embargo) would cause painful shocks to the global oil markets and 
would likely be opposed by America’s allies.362  Sanctions that indirectly 
affect demand for Iranian oil by making it more difficult for Iran to engage 
in petroleum transactions and invest in the infrastructure necessary to bring 
oil to market could allow Iran’s competitors to increase oil production to 
counter any slack in global oil supply, however.363
Legislation introduced in December 2010 by Senators Robert Casey (D-
PA) and Scott Brown (R-MA)  seeks to accomplish just that.
  Such a policy could be 
just as effective as an embargo without causing major diplomatic problems. 
364  Among its 
provisions, the bill expedites the process for the Treasury Department to 
investigate and designate the front-companies used by the Iranian 
Revolutionary Guard Corps—which controls much of the country’s 
petroleum industry—to evade sanctions.365  Sanctions would then be 
imposed on any party doing business with these front-companies.366
Additionally, the bill would sanction entities that subscribe to Iran’s 
sovereign debt, pay in advance for oil deliveries, or sign long-term contracts 
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to pay for oil and gas from Iran.367  The effect of these provisions would be 
to deny Iran access to the large up-front cash inflows it desperately needs to 
invest in its decaying infrastructure, or, otherwise, to deny Iran the ability to 
use the long-term supply contracts as collateral to raise debt.368
In sum, the 112th Congress should pass the Casey-Brown measure—or 
others like it—as early as possible.  Once passed, Congress should 
encourage the President to persuade America’s foreign partners to continue 
to do whatever is necessary to choke off Iran’s energy sector. 
  Such 
punitive measures could greatly reduce Iran’s ability to bring oil to market 
and deny the Iranian regime the revenue it needs to survive. 
CONCLUSION 
The issues raised by the Comprehensive Act are issues that are common 
to the conflicts created by the implementation American foreign policy.  As 
this Comment discusses, the Comprehensive Act raises potential legal and 
political conflicts between the President and Congress, the United States 
and its international allies, as well as between the United States and its 
adversaries. 
If the world does not want to live with a nuclear Iran, which has long 
made its belligerent ambitions apparent, then the world must learn from its 
past mistakes.  The Iranian regime must be sufficiently accosted for its 
aggressions if it is to sacrifice its nuclear ambitions.  Short of war, the 
rigorous sanctions that have been passed by the U.S. Congress and 
legislatures around the globe represent the only legitimate option to prevent 
Iran from acquiring weapons of mass destruction.  Nevertheless, it remains 
to be seen how far the President will go to prevent a nuclear Iran. 
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